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Abstract 
In the last two decades, asset-based social policies, which encourage families, 
especially low-income families, to accumulate assets by providing appropriate 
institutional settings, have received increasing attention from policymakers and 
researchers. Various programs and strategies have been outlined to improve saving 
and asset ownership opportunities in disadvantaged populations. Although there are 
multiple proposals of asset-based programs for children with disabilities, few of them 
have been implemented. 
To better inform asset-based policy practices for children with disabilities, this 
study examines asset effects for this population using the secondary survey data. 
Asset effects refer to the hypothesized positive influences of household assets on child 
development. A sample of children with disabilities is created from the Child 
Development Supplement of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID-CDS). This 
study has two specific aims: (1) To examine the relationship between household 
assets and children’s educational and health outcomes; and (2) To examine the 
mechanism of asset effects on children’s educational and health outcomes.  
From the life course perspective, the dissertation hypothesizes that household 
assets have cumulative effects on child development. Child well-being is a function of 
not only current household assets but also all previous household assets invested in 
the child. I propose four empirical strategies to test the hypothesis of asset effects for 
children with disabilities. The first set of analyses focuses on household assets 
measured before childbirth. The second strategy uses propensity score classification, 
which categorizes children into multiple groups based on households’ expected asset 
values. The third set of analyses applies the fixed-effects model to control for time-
invariant unobserved factors. The final analyses test the hypothesis of asset effects in 
 ii
a dynamic model using Structural Equations Modeling (SEM).  
The study finds that household assets have positive associations with child 
outcomes for children with disabilities, especially with health outcomes. Positive 
associations are more likely to be seen when household net worth is greater than 
$40,000 or liquid assets are greater than $10,000. Although the findings suggest that 
household assets in early childhood are more important for child well-being than 
household assets at a later stage, positive associations exist in both periods. The 
findings indicate the importance of having assets for the entire childhood. The study 
also shows that marginal effects of household assets are greater for low-income and 
low-wealth households.  
Findings of this study have important policy implications. Asset building 
should be included in the new vision of successful development for children with 
disabilities. For families raising children with disabilities, asset accumulation should 
start early and last long with a specific focus on health and health services. The 
minimum savings goal should be set at around $10,000. Asset-based programs for 
children with disabilities should be progressive toward low-income and low-wealth 
populations. 
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Chapter 1: Specific Aims 
This dissertation aims to test the associations between household assets 
(wealth) and child outcomes for children with disabilities, and to explore how 
household assets affect child development. It is a study of transformation of 
household financial capital to children’s human capital and health capital. The 
research questions are defined mainly by the focal independent variable—household 
assets. Findings of this study provide an empirical justification for the development of 
asset-based social policies, especially for the population of children with disabilities. 
Asset-based social policies (e.g., Individual Development Account [IDAs] and 
Child Development Accounts [CDAs]) encourage families, including disadvantaged 
families, to accumulate assets by providing appropriate institutional settings and 
financial incentives (Blank & Barr, 2009; McKernan & Sherraden, 2008; Prabhakar, 
2008; Regan, 2001;Regan & Paxton, 2001; Retsinas & Belsky, 2005; Schreiner & 
Sherraden, 2007; Sherraden, 2005; Sherraden & McBride, 2010). Initially suggested 
by Sherraden (1988, 1991), asset accumulation is becoming a new paradigm to guide 
policy efforts in helping people find a path out of poverty and achieve economic 
security. Various programs and strategies have been outlined to improve opportunities 
of saving and asset ownership in disadvantaged populations (Cramer et al., 2010; 
Cramer, O’Brien, & Lopez-Fernandini, 2008).  
At present, practices of asset-based programs for children are mainly based on 
theoretical discussions of asset effects for children. The hypothesis of asset effects 
suggests that asset accumulation can lead to positive economic, psychological and 
social outcomes for families and family members (Sherraden, 1991; Shanks, Kim, 
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Loke, & Destin, 2009).1 For example, household assets indicate economic protection. 
Children in wealthy households are well protected from economic hardship, have 
better access to education, and gain better educational and health outcomes. In the 
long run, household assets also contribute to a child’s social mobility and generate 
positive psychosocial effects on a child’s self-efficacy, future orientation, and civil 
engagement.  
However, few studies empirically test the hypothesis of asset effects for 
children, which presents a challenge to the development of asset-based policies. To 
better inform practice and policy, this study uses longitudinal data from the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to examine asset effects for a specific 
population—children with disabilities. The study has two aims: 
 Aim 1: To examine the relationship between household assets and 
educational and health outcomes for children with disabilities.  
Aim 2: To examine whether asset effects on educational and health outcomes 
for children with disabilities are mediated through parenting behaviors.  
Focusing on children with disabilities, the current study is motivated by 
several policy developments for children with disabilities. As a disadvantaged group, 
these children can benefit substantially from asset-based policies that match their 
development goals. For instance, the Social Security Administration is planning to 
develop Individual Development Accounts for youth with disabilities in Miami (SSA 
Office of Program Development & Research, 2008). A bill for the Disability Savings 
Act was proposed in the Senate in 2008 to use tax-advantaged savings tools to 
encourage individuals with disabilities and their families to save private funds for 
disability-related expenses, including education, medical services, employment 
                                                 
1 The study uses the term asset effects hereafter to refer to this hypothesis. 
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training and support, transportation, and other related services. In addition, the 
National Council of Disability (NCD) has proposed asset-based policies for youth 
with disabilities in its annual national disability policy progress reports (NCD, 2004, 
2005, 2006, & 2007).  
Another consideration of studying children with disabilities is that asset effects 
may vary by child characteristics. Childhood disability may create greater needs for 
economic resources for quality care, health services, and parents’ non-working time. 
In other words, the marginal effect of household assets for children with disabilities 
may be different from that for children without disabilities.  
This study contributes to the knowledge base in several ways. It examines 
asset effects on a specific population (i.e., children with disabilities), and extends 
current research to include health status (in addition to education) as a child outcome. 
This study also discusses several important questions related to the development of 
asset-based policies, including what amount of assets is needed to generate asset 
effects, which population benefits more from asset accumulation, and what empirical 
strategy is better to test the hypothesis of asset effects.  
4 
Chapter 2: Background  
 
            The research question regarding asset effects for children (and children with 
disabilities) is important for the development of asset-based policy. The conceptual 
discussion regarding this question is extensive (see Lerman & McKernan, 2008), and 
it relates to the research, originated in the late 1960s and early 1970s, on the 
association between child well-being and family background (Duncan, Featherman, & 
Duncan 1972; Hogan, 1981; Marini 1978). Asset effects for children with disabilities 
can be examined from a number of theoretical perspectives, including the theory of 
asset-based welfare (Sherraden, 1991), disability models (Bickenbach, 1992; 
Bickenbach, Chatterji, Badley & Üstün, 1999; Oliver, 1990), and theories regarding 
family backgrounds and child development (Conger & Donnellan, 2007). However 
different they are, there seems more consistency than controversy in their respective 
theoretical predictions of asset effects.  
Assets are rights or claims related to tangible or intangible property, including 
(1) money savings; (2) stocks, bonds, and other financial securities; (3) real property; 
(4) hard assets, such as automobiles, jewelry, art, and collectibles; (5) machines, 
equipment, tools, and other tangible components of productions; (6) durable 
household goods; (7) natural resources; and (8) copyrights, patents, and other 
intellectual property (Nam, Huang, & Sherraden, 2008; Sherraden, 1991). In general, 
households with assets perform better than those without in multiple family functions. 
The process of accumulating household assets not only changes parenting behaviors, 
parental characteristics, and home environment, but it also provides a supportive 
family context for child development. Children living in households with assets have 
better economic, social, and psychological well-being (Sherraden, 1991). More 
specifically, assets effects are achieved through the use of assets (asset spending) as 
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well as the ownership of assets (asset holding) (Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007). Table 
2.1 lists possible asset effects. 
TABLE 2.1 ABOUT HERE 
 
2.1 Asset Effects on Economic Security 
Household assets can be used to meet children’s basic needs and protect them 
from economic hardship, such as food insecurity and homelessness (Haveman & 
Wolfe, 1995; Lerman & McKernan; 2008; Sherraden, 1991). Such effects on 
consumption smoothing and economic well-being are often examined in conjunction 
with negative income shocks and economic crises. Severe economic hardship can lead 
to dysfunctional families and negative outcomes for both parents and children. 
Economic hardship and pressures increase the risk of emotional distress, behavioral 
problems, and marital conflicts (Conger & Donnellan, 2007), all of which may impair 
parental nurturance and involvement in child development. Assets in a family then 
provide a “firewall” against economic hardship and economic pressures. For those 
with sufficient household assets, negative financial events (such as job loss) may not 
necessarily translate into hardship or generate massive economic pressures. Therefore, 
household assets are negatively associated with economic hardship and pressures. To 
use assets for consumption smoothing allows families to maintain their 
socioeconomic status and avoid social and psychological problems (e.g., depression, 
marital breakup, child and spouse abuse, alcohol and drug use, and so on) (Lerman & 
McKernan, 2008).  
Using assets for consumption smoothing presents an effect of asset spending. 
Asset effects on household economic security, however, are not limited to asset 
spending. Asset holding itself may have positive effects on household economic 
security as well (Schreiner& Sherraden, 2006). The process of accumulating assets is 
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a sign of planning for the future, which in turn may reduce the risk of experiencing 
negative income shocks.  
 Asset effects on economic security are especially important for families that 
have children with disabilities. In many cases, having a child with a disability impairs 
a family’s earning capacity (Seligman & Darling, 2007) because parents (usually 
mothers) have to reduce their labor force participation and spend more time on child 
care (Breslau, 1983). It is perhaps not surprising that a large proportion of families 
raising children with disabilities live in poverty (Wang, 2005). These families are 
vulnerable to income fluctuation and have greater need of financial backup.  
2.2 Asset Effects on Access to Services and Support 
Household assets can be used to purchase services, such as medical treatment, 
rehabilitation, assistive technology, long-term care, and other health services, in 
desired quantity and quality for children with disabilities (WHO, 2001). Children with 
disabilities may require health-related services beyond the need of children without 
disabilities (Newacheck et al., 2009). Depending on the type of disability and the 
health condition, children may need a wide array of physicians and specialty care 
providers, and they are among the most vulnerable of all populations to any limitation 
or disruption in health services (Kogan, et al., 2009; Mithchell & Gaskin, 2004). For 
example, children with disabilities have greater need of respite care, babysitting and 
medical care (Darling, 1987). The biggest differences in health service utilization 
between children with and without disabilities are hospital days (464 vs. 55 days per 
1000 children) and home health care (Newacheck, Inkelas, & Kim, 2004). 
Services for children with disabilities are expensive. The need for specific 
medical care and frequent use of medically related services, such as physical, 
occupational, and language therapy, also contribute to the higher cost of health care. 
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Previous research has identified physical and occupational therapy, physician visits, 
and hospitalizations as the largest out-of-pocket expenses for families raising children 
with disabilities (Darling, 1987; Lukemeyer, Meyers, & Smeeding, 2000). Some 
children may need special equipment and supplies for daily living, which could be 
expensive as well. Other costs may be incurred as a result of housing and vehicle 
modifications. All of these add to a family’s financial burden. The average direct out-
of-pocket expenditure for families of children with disabilities is more than twice that 
for other families. According to Kuhlthau et al (2005), four out of every ten families 
caring for children with disabilities report financial concerns.  
The literature also shows a higher level of unmet needs among children with 
disabilities (Mithchell & Gaskin, 2004). More than 30% of children with special 
health care needs are classified as underinsured, due to a lack of adequate primary and 
preventive services, uneven access to subspecialty care and specialized therapies, poor 
service coordination, and barriers to other direct services (Kogan, Newacheck, 
Honberg, & Strickland, 2005; Perrin, 2002). About 10-20% of children with 
disabilities do not receive specialty care, therapy services, home health services, and 
mental health services as needed (Mithchell & Gaskin, 2004). Studies consistently 
find that underinsured children with disabilities are overrepresented in low-income 
families, and their families have more financial problems and difficulty in obtaining 
specialty referrals (Davidoff, 2004; Parish, Shattuck, & Rose, 2009). 
Given the high unmet needs and high costs of health services, household 
assets are a key determinant of health care for children with disabilities, in addition to 
various possible sources of support (Korpela, Siirtola, Koivikko, 1992; Parish et al., 
2009; Perrin, 2002; Shattuck & Parish, 2008). The existence of the public health 
services provided by the government (such as Medicaid, Medicare, and State 
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Children’s Health Insurance Program) is not likely to diminish the importance of 
household economic resources because health services provided by the public health 
system may be inadequate and therefore necessitate families’ pursuit of health 
services from other sources.  
Household economic resources can have a unique role in healthcare even for 
families covered by health insurance. With employment-based private insurance, 
families raising children with disabilities typically have higher total expenditures and 
out-of-pocket expenditures than those covered by public insurance (Honberg et al., 
2009; Kogan et al., 2009; Newacheck et al., 2000). As the cost of employment-based 
health insurance is increasingly shifted toward employees (Kogan et al., 2009), family 
economic resources have become more important than ever. Undoubtedly, household 
assets also provide necessary protection when families lose their insurance coverage. 
In the face of job loss and ineligibility for public insurance, families may spend down 
their savings to purchase commercial health insurance (Kogan et al., 2009).  
2.3 Asset Effects on Family Investment in Child Development 
Households with assets have financial resources to invest in children’s human 
capital, improve their life chances (Mayer, 1997), and provide a ladder for social 
mobility (Conley, 2001; Shapiro, 2004). This idea is rooted in the belief that the more 
families invest in children the more likely they will succeed in the future.  
Assets are connected, in a number of ways, to family investment in children. 
One such investment is health services discussed above. Another important 
investment is children’s academic and cognitive development (Conley, 2001; Nam & 
Huang, 2009; Orr, 2003; Yeung & Conley, 2008; Zhan, 2006; Zhan & Sherraden, 
2003). Compared to those of wealthy families, low-wealth children often live in 
physical environments offering less stimulation and fewer resources (e.g., educational 
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toys and books) for learning. In contrast, wealthy families are more likely to provide 
opportunities for children to receive high-quality education, and even pay for their 
post-secondary education. Second, home equity is generally the most important asset 
in a family, and home ownership indicates not only a family’s standard of living but 
also its school and neighborhood environments. Wealthy families can choose a home 
located in a good neighborhood and school district. Last but not least important, 
families with assets are more likely to have high expectations for children and be 
more willing to invest in child investment. 
  Household assets are found to be positively related to children’s academic 
performance, measured by standardized test scores or grades controlling for a range of 
covariates (such as household characteristics, parental characteristics, parenting 
behaviors, and children’s characteristics) (Orr, 2003; Shanks, 2007; Zhan, 2006; Zhan 
& Sherraden, 2003). But the magnitude of asset effects varies. For example, 
children’s math scores increase by .29, .34, 1.01, and 1.57 units, respectively, as a 
result of doubling household net worth as reported in Elliott (2008), Orr (2003), 
Yeung and Conley (2008), and Zhan (2006).  
Household assets also have indirect effects on children’s academic 
performance through parenting behaviors and home environment. Orr (2003) 
indicates that asset effects decrease by 15% when parenting variables and home 
environment are included in analyses (e.g., educational resources in home and 
parental involvement). When a mother’s expectation for a child’s educational 
attainment is included, the grade difference between children of homeowners and 
renters decreases by nearly 40% (Zhan & Sherraden, 2003). As both home ownership 
and the mother’s savings are positively related to the mother’s expectations, the 
results suggest that asset effects are partially mediated by mother’s expectations 
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(Zhan & Sherraden, 2003; Zhan, 2006).  
In addition to academic performance, household assets are positively related to 
children’s school and educational attainment, including total schooling years (Conley, 
2001; Nam & Huang, 2009), high school graduation (Zhan & Sherraden, 2003), 
college attendance (Conley, 2001; Nam & Huang, 2009), college graduation (Zhan & 
Sherraden, 2010), and the number of post-high school years (Conley, 2001). When 
household net worth is doubled, the total number of schooling years increases by 
about a year (Conley, 2001; Nam & Huang, 2009). Zhan and Sherraden (2003) 
indicate that children whose mothers have savings higher than $3,000 have the odds 
of high school graduation 1.3 times greater than those whose mothers have no savings. 
In addition, when parental net worth increases by 100%, the probability of college 
attendance increases by 8.3% (Conley, 2001).  
2.4 Asset Effects on Psychological Well-being 
Asset holding can shape positive psychological well-being (Schreiner & 
Sherraden, 2007; Sherraden, 1991). People with assets tend to be oriented toward 
long-term goals and plan for the future. Life chances on the basis of accumulated 
assets can be internalized into the cognitive structure of individuals, particularly 
during early stages of the life cycle. Children from families owning assets are more 
likely to develop future orientation, self-esteem, and self-efficacy, which are of great 
importance for children with disabilities (Goodley & Lawthom, 2006). Previous 
studies find a connection between household assets and children’s educational 
expectation and aspiration (e.g., Zhan & Sherraden, 2003). Families holding assets 
often convey high expectations for children, help children shape the behaviors needed 
to achieve educational goals, and even present themselves as role models for children 
to emulate (Shanks et al., 2009; Davis-Kean, 2005; Goyette & Xie, 1999; Singh et. al, 
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1995). 
Asset spending can also create positive psychological well-being. During 
economic hard times, owning assets for consumption smoothing not only ensures the 
level of consumption, but also creates a sense of control, safety, and greater life 
satisfaction (Sherraden, 1991).  
2.5 Supportive Family Context and Conceptual Model 
The above mentioned asset effects on family functioning for children with 
disabilities and their families are proposed as indirect effects through parenting 
behaviors, parent-child interaction, and home environment, because children 
generally do not have direct control over household economic resources. Similar to 
the mediation mechanism suggested by previous studies (e.g., Berger, Paxson, & 
Waldfogel, 2009), holding assets may bring changes in parents’ behaviors and home 
environment, which eventually translates into better family functioning (in economic 
support, health care, recreation, socialization, self-identity, affection, and education) 
that influence child development (Marshak, Seligman, & Prezant, 1999). If we see 
home environment, parental characteristics, and family functioning altogether as 
family context, then it is by providing a supportive family context that household 
assets exert effects on children.  
FIGURE 2.1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 2.1 describes the mediation mechanism linking household assets and 
child well-being. According to the life course theory and studies of household income 
and child well-being (e.g., Berger et al., 2009; Mortimer & Shanahan, 2006), parental 
characteristics broadly include socioeconomic characteristics, parental attitudes, 
parenting behaviors, and parent-child interaction. Home environment is defined as the 
physical environment. Child well-being may include but is not limited to economic 
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well-being, health status, cognitive development and educational achievement. 
It seems reasonable to suggest that household assets have effects for children 
with disabilities similar to those for children without disabilities, since psychological 
studies already show the importance of a supportive family context for children with 
disabilities (Lewis, 2003). For families raising children with disabilities, there may be 
unique challenges and negative experiences related to child disability, such as 
financial strain, parenting stress, and parental mental illness. In turn, these problems 
become environmental barriers for child development. It is not clear if there is any 
interaction between asset effects and these negative experiences related to child 
disability. But as expected, parents of a child with a disability may relocate family 
resources by investing more in child’s health care than other domains of child 
development. Also, child disability may influence (increase or decrease) parents’ 
willingness to invest in child development, given the uncertainty of investment return. 
Figure 2.2 depicts possible linkages from household assets to child well-being, with a 
consideration of child disability. Child disability may also influence family economic 
resources, family context, parenting behaviors (e.g., educational expectation), and 
child well-being.  
FIGURE 2.2 ABOUT HERE 
 
2.6 Summary 
To sum up, there is a positive relationship between assets and many measures 
of child well-being. Parents with assets have more economic resources to invest in 
child development and to purchase services, and they have more control over their life 
style and family relations. Asset holding adds to their coping ability in dealing with 
disability-related challenges and stress, and it also increases family stability. Asset 
holding can shape parenting behaviors and improve the well-being of children with 
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disabilities. This study will first test the associations between household assets and 
educational and health outcomes of children with disabilities in reduced-form models 
controlling for household demographics and socioeconomic characteristics; it will 
further test the hypothesized mediation mechanism from household assets to parenting 
behaviors and then to child well-being. It is hypothesized that, (1) for children with 
disabilities, household assets have positive effects on academic achievement, school 
attainment, health service access, and global health status; and (2) the mechanism of 
asset effects for children is that household assets affect children though parenting 
behaviors, such as parental involvement in child development and parental warmth.  
 
 
14
 
Chapter 3: Data and Measure 
3.1 Data Overview 
Data for the study are from the Child Development Supplement (CDS) in the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID is a longitudinal survey that is 
publicly available through the Institute for Social Research at the University of 
Michigan (ISP, 2009). The PSID collects demographic information and 
socioeconomic characteristics from a nationally representative sample of individuals 
and their families annually from 1968-1997 and biennially thereafter.  
Beginning in 1997, the PSID researchers supplemented its core data with 
additional information from a group of children 0-12 years old (N=3,563) and their 
parents from 2,380 families in the Child Development Supplement (CDS). The same 
children were interviewed in 1997, 2002, and 2007, respectively, if they were still 
younger than age 18 at the time of each interview. After age 18, the child exits the 
CDS, and enters another PSID supplement, Transition into Adulthood (TA), which 
has been conducted twice (2005 and 2007). Figure 3.1 shows the connection between 
the CDS and the TA.2 The actual sample size of each wave is listed in the figure.  
FIGURE 3.1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The CDS includes measures of a broad array of child developmental outcomes, 
such as physical health and disability, emotional well-being, cognitive and academic 
achievement, and social relationships with family and peers (ISP, 2009). The CDS 
data are collected from multiple individuals using varied methodology. There are 
several modules in the CDS: (1) the primary caregiver interview, (2) the child 
interview (for those aged 10 and older), (3) the standardized educational achievement 
                                                 
2 This study does not use the information in the PSID-TA.  
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assessment, (4) time diary of child activities, and (5) the other caregiver questionnaire. 
A combination of the CDS and the PSID family data can be used to examine the 
association between household assets and developmental outcomes for children with 
disabilities.  
The PSID main files and the CDS supplemental files contain major variables 
of interest, including household assets, child disability, and child’s educational and 
health outcomes. Household assets have been measured in 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, 
and biennially thereafter. Detailed information regarding these measures is provided 
in the measurement section below, and the interview years of these measures are 
provided in Table 3.1. In addition, the repeated measures in the PSID-CDS are 
preferred over cross-sectional data. Taking advantage of the longitudinal information 
provided by the PSID-CDS, this study can choose with flexibility the appropriate 
measures and samples to investigate the questions of interest.  
TABLE 3.1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The PSID-CDS, however, has several limitations to the questions of interest. 
First, its sample size is relatively small (3,563 in Wave I; 2,907 in Wave II; and 1,506 
in Wave III). When the sample is limited to children with disabilities, it becomes even 
smaller. Second, measures of major variables are not included in every wave of the 
PSID (see Table 3.1). In addition, the three CDS waves with long intervals in between 
(five years) are not sufficient to show developmental trajectories of the CDS children. 
While some of these limitations can be addressed by alternative data sources, such as 
the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) or the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth 79 Children (NLSY’79) (both of which have greater sample sizes), 
these alternative data have their own disadvantages. For example, the SIPP does not 
have all major variables of the study in each wave and is limited by its short panels 
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(2.5-4 years) for each sample. The short panel restricts a long-term examination of 
asset effects. While the NLSY’79 includes major variables in most of its interviews, 
its asset measures have relatively lower response rates than those in the PSID. 
Comparatively, the PSID produces more reliable asset measures because of the way 
its asset questions are set up (Yeung and Conley, 2008). It would be desirable to test 
asset effects using all three datasets discussed above. The two alternative data sources 
are left for future examination.  
3.2 Sample Selection 
The study sample includes only the CDS children with disabilities. Child 
disability measures are indicated by health conditions recorded in the CDS, and the 
measure of child disability will be discussed in greater detail in the measurement 
section. Several criteria in addition to child disability are utilized for sample selection. 
The study includes the CDS children with disabilities who are (1) white or black; (2) 
living in households headed by American citizens; and (3) living with at least one 
biological parent when reporting disability. The study includes only white or black 
children because of the small sample sizes for other racial or ethnic groups. For 
example, in the CDS-I, there are only seven children with disabilities identified as 
other ethnic groups. For the same reason, immigrants are excluded from the study 
sample. There are 52 children living in households headed by immigrants in the CDS-
I. Based on these sample selection criteria, the sample includes a total of 1,065 
children with disabilities in at least one of the CDS waves: 518 children in Wave I, 
563 in Wave II, and 389 in Wave III. 
3.3 Measures 
3.3.1 Child Disability 
        The CDS asks primary caregivers to report child’s health and mental health, 
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including a series of chronic health conditions (such as epilepsy or convulsions, 
speech impairment, and so on). The same list of chronic conditions can be found in 
other major child surveys, such as the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 
Cohort-Children (NLSY79 Children) and the National Longitudinal Study of 
Adolescence Health (ADD Health). According to the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (IDEA 2004),3 there are 14 specific primary conditions under the lead 
definition of “child with a disability.” Ten of these primary conditions are recorded in 
the CDS. Therefore, a CDS child who has a positive response on any of these 
conditions is considered a child with a disability and is included in the study sample.4  
To combine different types of health conditions under a unified measure of 
child disability, however, raises a concern because different types of disability may 
indicate different development trajectories and outcomes. To address this issue, the 
study uses dichotomous indicators of these health conditions as control variables.  
3.3.2 Educational and Health Outcomes 
Pollard and Lee (2003) provide a unified definition of child well-being as “a 
multidimensional construct incorporating mental/psychological, physical, and social 
dimensions” (p.64). This definition includes five operationalized domains: physical, 
psychological, cognitive, social, and economic. The focus of this study—educational 
and health outcomes—covers both physical and cognitive domains.  
                                                 
3 Child with a disability means a child evaluated in accordance with §§300.304 
through 300.311 of IDEA as having mental retardation, a hearing impairment 
(including deafness), a speech or language impairment, a visual impairment 
(including blindness), a serious emotional disturbance (referred to in this part as 
“emotional disturbance”), an orthopedic impairment, autism, traumatic brain injury, 
other health impairment, a specific learning disability, deaf-blindness, or multiple 
disabilities, and who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related services. 
(IDEA, § 300.8) 
 
4 These conditions in the CDS are epilepsy, speech impairment, hearing difficulty, 
difficulty seeing, retardation, emotional disturbance, orthopedic impairment, 
developmental delay, learning disability, autism, and hyperactivity. 
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The CDS includes a series of indicators of educational achievement of 
children. The study uses four educational outcomes: Two subsets of the Woodcock-
Johnson Revised Tests of Achievement (WJ-R), repeated grade, and school 
suspension or expulsion in childhood. The WJ-R is a well-established and respected 
measure with information on several dimensions of intellectual ability, including 
degree of mastery in mathematics and reading (Woodcock & Mather, 1990). Two 
subsets of the WJ-R (the Applied Problem test and the Broad Reading test) are 
administered in all three waves of the CDS for children aged three years and older and 
are considered measures of math and reading achievement (academic achievement). 
The standardized scales of these two tests range from 0-200. The CDS also reveals 
whether a child has ever repeated a grade (Yes=1/No=0) since kindergarten and 
whether a child has ever been suspended or expelled from school (Yes=1/No=0).  
The outcome measures regarding health status and service utilization in 
childhood include the global health status (a Likert scale variable from Excellent to 
Poor reported by primary caregivers), the number of school days missed due to 
physical illness (a count variable), the frequency of hospitalization in the last five 
years (a count variable), the number of doctor visits for physical illness last year (a 
count variable), and visiting a doctor for emotional problems or not (Yes=1/No=0). 
The variable of global health status, a commonly used health measure, is recoded into 
a dichotomous one (Excellent=1/Otherwise=0) in all analyses. In some analyses, the 
count variables are recoded as dichotomous measures (Frequency greater than 
0=1/Otherwise=0).  
3.3.3 Asset Measures  
Two continuous asset measures—household net worth and liquid assets—are 
created and used as the focal measures of household assets. The wealth modules in the 
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PSID family files (see Table 3.1) collect information on multiple household asset 
types, including (1) home, (2) business/farm, (3) other real estate, (4) vehicles, (5) 
checking/savings, (6) stocks and mutual funds, (7) other savings, and (8) unsecured 
debts. However, it is not feasible to examine all of these asset types in the study. 
Household net worth is the sum of all of these asset types net of all debts. It indicates 
economic resources available to households if they sell all these assets, and it reveals 
a household’s net economic position. Liquid assets are the sum of checking/savings, 
stocks and mutual funds, and other savings; it is relatively easy to convert liquid 
assets into cash. Previous studies have shown that liquid assets are more likely to 
affect child outcomes (Conley, 2001; Nam & Huang, 2009). 
Following the convention in the literature to address skewness and to obtain a 
semi-elasticity explanation (Conley, 2001; Nam & Huang, 2009; Orr, 2003), the 
logarithm of net worth and liquid assets are created for regression analyses. Zero 
liquid asset values and zero/negative net worth values are recoded as 1 prior to the 
transformation. In addition, to capture the nonlinear effects of household assets, a 
four-level categorical variable is created for net worth (<$0, $0-10,000, $10,001-
40,000, and >$40,000). These thresholds are chosen for two reasons. First, they are 
very close to the quartiles of the net worth distribution in the sample but easier to 
remember than the exact quartile numbers (which can be helpful in result 
interpretation). The three quartiles of net worth in the sample are $50, $9,400, and 
$39,000, respectively. Results of analyses using this categorical net worth measure do 
not differ from those using the quartiles. Second, negative net worth values are 
categorized into one group since negative net worth may have effects on child 
outcomes different from other groups (Nam & Huang, 2009). A four-level categorical 
variable for liquid assets is also created using the thresholds close to the exact quartile 
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values of liquid assets ($0, $1-1,000, $1,001-10,000, and >$10,000).5  
3.3.4 Other Measures 
TABLE 3.2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The study includes four groups of control variables (see Table 3.2). The first 
group is child’s characteristics, including age, gender (Male=1/Female=0), race 
(Black=1/White=0), disability types, timing of reporting disability (Wave I, II, or III), 
special education (Yes=1/No=0), and health insurance coverage (No insurance=0, 
Employer provided=1, and Government provided=2).6 The second group includes 
indicators of household header’s characteristics, such as gender and employment 
(Employed=1/Otherwise=0). The analyses also include mother’s characteristics, such 
as age, education (Less than high school=0, High school=1, Some college=2, and 
Four-year college and above=3), and marital status (Married=1/Otherwise=0). Third, 
household characteristics are indicated by household size, number of children, 
average household income in previous five years (logarithm), and public program 
participation (AFDC/TANF, Food Stamp, and Supplemental Security Income).  
The fourth group includes four parenting behaviors that are proposed 
mediators in the study. Parental involvement is indicated by a composite scale created 
by the PSID to measure parents’ cognitive stimulation and emotional support for child 
development. Examples of survey questions on this scale are how many books child 
                                                 
5 I used different measures of net worth and liquid assets for sensitivity tests. For 
example, different thresholds for categorical asset measures are tested. In one 
sensitivity test, I include both categorical and continuous net worth measures as 
independent variables: The continuous measure is log-transformed net worth value, 
and the categorical measure indicates whether households have negative, zero, or 
positive net worth.  
 
6 Eight children with private insurance are included in the category of employer-
provided insurance. 
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has and how often child eats with mother and father. Items on this scale vary in the 
three waves of the CDS; therefore, the range of parental involvement also varies. For 
example, in the CDS-I, the value of parental involvement ranges from 7 to 27, with 
higher scores indicating more involvement. Two indicators of the quality of parenting 
are parenting stress and parental warmth. Parenting stress is measured by a seven-item 
index indicating the primary caregiver’s feelings and perceptions about caring for the 
child (e.g., “There are some things that (child) does that really bother me a lot.”). The 
six-item parental warmth scale measures the warmth of the relationship between the 
child and parent in the month prior to the interview, including the frequency of 
showing physical affection, emotional support, and appreciation, and playing with the 
child or participating in the child’s favorite activities. Developed by Child Trends, Inc. 
(Hofferth, Davis-Kean, Davis, Finkelstein, 1998), both scales range from 1 to 5, with 
a higher score indicating a greater degree of the measured constructs (stress and 
warmth). In addition, this study includes a three-level measure of parents’ educational 
expectations for children (High school or below=1, Some college=2, and Four year 
college or above=3). 
3.4 Missing Data 
Missing data in a longitudinal survey can be a complicated issue. In the case 
of the PSID-CDS, missing data result from long-term attrition, changes in interview 
eligibility, imputation procedures already applied by the PSID,7 and the data frame 
defined by each specific study. The PSID-CDS user’s guide suggests using 
appropriate sampling weight or multiple imputation methods to deal with the missing 
                                                 
7 PSID imputes missing values on wealth variables. Among all interviewed families, 
there are 307 cases (4.4%) in the 1999 family data and 347 cases (4.7%) in the 2001 
family data receiving imputation on wealth variables. PSID imputes these missing 
values using inflation-adjusted wealth values in previous waves of PSID first. If 
previous values are not available, a mean wealth value after categorizing by family 
income and age of head in the group is used for imputation.  
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data (ISR, 2009). This study uses a multiple imputation (MI) procedure to deal with 
missing data. The MI is a repeated imputation approach that creates a small number of 
copies of the data, and each copy has missing values imputed. Each copy of the data is 
analyzed by standard statistical methods, and the results are combined to produce 
estimates and confidence interval (Rubin, 1987). MI procedure in this study is based 
on an iterative multivariate regression technique (Royston, 2004, 2005a, & 2005b), 
and ten simulated datasets (or imputed datasets) are created.8  
                                                 
8 Twenty imputed datasets are used for sensitivity tests.  
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Chapter 4: Empirical Strategies 
4.1 Cumulative Effects of Household Assets 
The hypothesis of asset effects for children with disabilities can be expressed 
in a population model of Equation 4.1:  
0 1 2( , , ...... , )t tY F A A A A O=    (4.1) 
Where t indicates a child’s age, Y  indicates a child outcome measure, A is 
household assets, and O is other factors affecting child well-being (such as genetic 
inheritance, child characteristics, disability status, home environment, parental 
characteristics, social support, neighbor and school environment, policy context, and 
so on). In a word, child outcome at age t is a function of not only current household 
assets (At), but also all previous household assets from A0 to At.9 It is reasonable to 
hypothesize that current child outcome is a cumulative effect of all previous 
investments, indicated by household assets at different ages of a child from A0 to At.  
It is still not clear what the specific functional form (F()) in Equation 4.1  is. 
The theoretical development of asset effects for children is not sophisticated enough 
to specify this functional form. For simplicity, suppose F() is a linear and additive 
function on regression coefficients:  
0 0 1 1 2 2 ...... t t t t tt A A A AY Oβ β β β γ μ+ + + += +   (4.2) 
β , a scalar, is a regression coefficient of assets at a certain age (i.e., tβ  for age t); 
tγ is a N×1 matrix if tO includes N factors; and tμ  is the error term in the model. 
Since the PSID-CDS children are observed three times in the data, Equation 4.2 can 
be further specified for the three observation periods (4.3): 
                                                 
9 Theoretically, future assets may affect current child outcome as well. For example, 
by knowing that their families have sufficient financial resources for future college 
costs, children may have desirable educational outcomes. 
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The model of 1tY +  includes one more predictor ( 1tA + ) than the model of tY , and, 
similarly, the model of 2tY +  adds another predictor ( 2tA + ) based on the model of 1tY + . 
Since household assets have a hypothetically positive relationship with child 
outcomes, the mean of regression coefficients of asset measures in each model 
( ,  ,  and β β β′ ′′ ), or the average effects of previous household assets on current child 
outcome, is likely to be greater than 0. Each individual coefficient ( ,   and β β β′ ′′ ), 
however, is not necessarily greater than 0. 
There are several possibilities regarding the pattern from 0β  to tβ  in the 
model of tY . One possibility is that the closer the times household assets and child 
outcome are observed, the bigger the regression coefficients of asset measures are 
( ,   m n if m n tβ β< < ≤ ). In other words, current assets are considered more important 
than earlier assets for current outcome measures. If this is the pattern, it seems 
reasonable to say that t t tβ β β′′ ′< <  across three models of Yt+2, Yt+1, and Yt . A 
specific example of this pattern may be the relationships among household assets, 
household liquidity constraints, and children’s college entry: Household assets 
measured closer to children’s college entry are more important than those measured in 
an earlier stage regarding children’s college entry.  
The second possible pattern is the opposite, in which household assets in early 
childhood are more important than later assets for child development 
( ,   m n if m n tβ β> < ≤ ). Studies by Heckman and his colleagues (e.g., Cunha & 
Heckman, 2010) suggest that family investment in early childhood is more efficient 
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than that in late childhood. The third possibility is that for specific outcome measures, 
household assets have expected positive effects only in certain age ranges 
( 0,   t if m t nβ > < < ). These age ranges are key stages for particular development 
goals. The third pattern seems consistent with theoretical discussions of child growth 
and development stages. Finally, the fourth possibility is that asset effects at different 
ages are similar ( 0 1 2...... tβ β β β≈ ≈ ≈ ). Nonetheless, the pattern from 0β  to tβ  may 
vary by child outcome measures, and different patterns have variant policy 
implications.  
4.2 Four Empirical Strategies 
 To test asset effects for children with disabilities, all factors specified in O of 
Equation 4.2 (e.g., genetic inheritance, child characteristics, disability status, home 
environment, parental characteristics, social support, neighbor and school 
environment, policy context, and so on) should be controlled for in the model, 
especially those affecting both household asset accumulation and child outcomes. If at 
all possible, an experiment with randomly assigned assets would be the best option to 
control for these factors. Unfortunately, this is not possible for the current study for 
which the observed secondary data are used. Therefore, I include some of these 
factors as control variables in regression analyses, a conventional practice in the 
literature. Four groups of control variables are proposed in Chapter 3 (see Table 3.2). 
The strategy of adding control variables is robust in general, but not without 
limitations. First, factors correlated with household assets and child outcomes, if not 
observed or measured in the data, can by no means be controlled for. This is the so-
called “omitted variable bias.” For example, children’s genetic inheritance, parents’ 
saving taste and financial capability, and parents’ future orientation may affect both 
household assets and child outcomes, but they are not measured in the PSID-CDS. In 
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addition, as the theory in this area is far from adequately developed, some factors 
important for both household assets and child outcomes yet not defined are likely not 
to be included in analyses. Second, the strategy of controlling variables works well 
under the assumption that the confoundedness between household assets and control 
variables is correctly specified and the sample data on control variables are balanced 
by the level of the focal independent variable. Failure to meet these assumptions 
would create the problem of estimation bias. For example, to simply add variables, 
such as household income and household head’s education and employment, as 
control variables in the model may cause misspecification because such a model 
assumes linearity when the way these variables affect asset accumulation and child 
outcomes is actually nonlinear.   
FIGURE 4.1 ABOUT HERE 
 
To address these two issues, the study proposes four empirical strategies, 
focusing on several key confounding variables that affect both household assets and 
child outcomes. As shown in Figure 4.1, some factors may influence household assets 
(that is, household assets are endogenous variables). These factors include child 
characteristics (e.g., disability types), program and services (e.g., Medicaid & SSI), 
household socioeconomic status (e.g., income and education), and child outcomes. 
The solid-line arrow in Figure 4.1 is the research interest of the study—asset effects 
on child outcomes. In order to have a consistent estimate of asset effects, 
confoundedness represented by the dotted-line arrows should be addressed.  
            Clearly, both child characteristics and programs/services can affect parents’ 
saving behaviors. For example, as a result of expensive health services needed by 
their children with disabilities, parents are less likely to save, or parents may have 
strong motives for precautionary savings for children’s health expenditure. In addition, 
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the dependent measures of child outcomes (e.g., health service utilization and health 
status) are likely to affect household assets as well. High levels of health service 
utilization (indicated by the number of doctor visits and hospitalization) may decrease 
household assets. Similarly, public service utilization or means-tested programs may 
change parents’ saving behaviors as well. Public programs may crowd out the need 
for private financial resources (e.g., savings).  
4.2.1 Assets Measured Before Childbirth 
Taking the advantage of longitudinal data, the first empirical strategy uses 
household assets measured before childbirth. Specifically, the 1984, 1989, and 1994 
asset measures are used for children born between 1985-1989, 1990-1994, and 1995-
1997, respectively. This design is to address the above concern that household assets 
may be affected by child outcome measures, other child characteristics, and program 
services.  Logically, everything that occurs after childbirth—such as children’s 
disability type, development outcomes, and programs/services children receives—
cannot affect household assets measured before childbirth.  
FIGURE 4.2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Child outcome measures in the first strategy are defined at the second wave 
(2002) of the PSID-CDS. This way, analyses can include all children who have a 
disability in the first or second wave. This results in a slightly larger sample size 
(N=732). By contrast, to choose outcome measures in the first wave (1997), those 
reporting disabilities in the second wave would be excluded from the study sample; if 
outcome measures in the third wave (2007) are chosen, then missing values raise a 
concern because a high proportion of children are not interviewed as they are aged out 
of the CDS survey (see Figure 3.1).  
Household characteristics (the second and third groups of control variables, 
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see Table 3.2) in this set of analyses are measured in the same year as asset measures 
are. The other two groups of control variables—child characteristics and parenting 
behaviors are defined at the first wave (1997) of the CDS. Figure 4.2 illustrates the 
design of the first strategy. It is a simplified version of Equation 4.2 without including 
asset measures in childhood (from A1 to At):  
0 0t t tY A Oβ γ= +    (4.4) 
Analyses employing the first empirical strategy have five model specifications 
for each outcome measure. First, Model 1, the baseline model, includes only 
household and child’s characteristics as independent variables. The second and third 
models (Models 2 and 3) add the continuous and categorical asset measures, 
respectively. Models 4 and 5 extend Models 2 and 3 by adding parenting behavior 
variables. These five models are the major model specifications (with minor 
modifications) in the other three empirical strategies as well.   
4.2.2 Propensity Score Classification  
The first strategy, although useful, cannot address the confoundedness of 
household assets and other indicators of household socioeconomic status (e.g., 
household income and household head’s education). The confoundedness between 
household assets and household socioeconomic status is unlikely to be linear and 
additive. In this situation, the conventional approach of adding control variables in 
regression may not address the confoundedness issue. Hence, the current study uses 
propensity score classification (Imai & Van Dyk, 2004) in the second empirical 
strategy. The same study sample for the first strategy (N=732, see Figure 4.2) is used. 
An obvious advantage of the propensity score analysis is that it does not assume the 
confoundedness between assets and other socioeconomic characteristics (e.g., income 
and education) to be additive or linear. More important, it can be used to balance 
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socioeconomic variables for households with different levels of assets.  
The propensity score method was originally proposed by Rubin (1974, 1977, 
1978, & 1986). There is extensive literature on this method (e.g., Guo & Fraser, 2009). 
Briefly speaking, the propensity score method suggests that asset effects can be 
consistently estimated only when individuals who have similar values on the 
confounding variables are compared. If there is only one confounding factor, such as 
household income, the practice is to first categorize the sample into multiple groups 
by household income and then to estimate asset effects within each group. This 
approach becomes rather cumbersome, however, if there are multiple confounding 
variables, because it is difficult to simultaneously categorize multiple variables (the 
high-dimensional issue).  
To solve this problem, the propensity score approach estimates an individual’s 
expected value on the focal independent variable using all observed confounding 
variables.10 The expected value (also called the propensity score) is a one-dimensional 
balancing score for observed confounding variables. The study sample can be 
classified, weighted, or matched based on this propensity score before the effect of the 
independent variable is examined. Following this procedure, the study uses household 
characteristics and household head’s characteristics (the second and third groups of 
control variables) to predict asset values. The study sample then is categorized into 
three groups by the predicted asset value. As indicated in Equation 4.5, asset effects 
for children with disabilities are assessed within each group, 
0 0g g gg gt A OY γβ +=    (4.5) 
where the new subscription g indicates the number of groups created by propensity 
                                                 
10 In the case of a dichotomous focal independent variable or a dichotomous 
“treatment” variable, its expected probability is estimated. Propensity score analysis 
has been commonly used for this type of “treatment” variables.  
30
 
score classification. To be clear, in this strategy household assets are still measured 
before childbirth ( 0A ). More detail about propensity score classification is provided in 
Appendix A.  
4.2.3 Fixed-Effects Models 
Unobserved factors highlighted in Figure 4.1 may seriously bias the estimated 
asset effects, but neither of the above discussed strategies can address this problem. 
Time-invariant unobservable factors are typically addressed using the fixed-effects 
regression model. The third empirical strategy proposes fixed-effects analyses to 
further examine the effects of household assets for children with disabilities. Different 
from the sample used in the first two strategies, the study sample of the third strategy 
includes all PSID-CDS children reporting disability in any of the three waves 
(N=1,056), and, theoretically, each subject is observed three times.11 Table 4.1 
displays the timing of the measures in the three observations.  
TABLE 4.1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Fixed-effects estimation of asset effects for children can be expressed as: 
1...1056,  1, 2,3, it i it it it i tY A Oα β γ ε = == + + +         (4.6) 
Where i is individual and t is time points from Wave I to III, and the other notations 
are consistent with the above equations. In this framework, iα  estimates the 
heterogeneous individual effect that is fixed over time for each subject. This 
estimation also takes into account all unobserved factors that are time-invariant.  
While it may seem reasonable to use the fixed-effects model to control for 
unobserved effects, this does not appear to be completely consistent with the 
                                                 
11 Not all children have three observations in three waves of the PSID-CDS due to 
missing data and changes of eligibility rules. For example, more than half of CDS 
children were not eligible for CDS Wave III because they were older than 18 in 2007. 
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conceptual model proposed in Equations 4.3. The fixed-effects model in Equation 4.6 
can be further specified for the observations at the three waves, respectively: 
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
it i it it it
iit it it it
iit it it it
Y A O
Y A O
Y A O
α β γ ε
α β γ ε
α β γ ε
+ + + +
+ + + +
= + + +
= + + +
= + + +
        (4.7) 
A comparison of Equations 4.7 and Equations 4.3 reveals several differences. For 
convenience, Equations 4.3 is slightly modified as follows (Equations 4.8): 
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First, it allows for different regression coefficients of asset measures ( 1 2, ' , ''t t tβ β β+ + ) 
over the three waves, while the fixed-effects model assumes a fixed regression 
coefficient of asset measures over time ( β ). This inconsistency may not cause a 
problem because the varied regression coefficients can be modeled in fixed-effects 
analysis by adding the interaction term of assets and time.  
Second, the fixed-effects model uses a fixed term iα  to replace the three terms 
in the parentheses in Equations 4.8. Theoretically, these terms are cumulative effects 
of previous assets (current assets not included), and they are not likely to stay the 
same over time. To fit the format of the fixed-effects model, Equations 4.8 can be 
further modified as 4.9 below: 
0 0 1 1 2 2 1 1
1 1 0 0 1 1 2 2
2 2 0 0 1 1 2 2
1 1 1
2 2
......
......
......
(
(
(
)
)
t it iti i i t it
t itt it i i i
t it it i i i
it i it i
i iit it it
iit it
A O A A A A
A O A A A A
A O A A A A
Y
Y
Y
γ μ
γ
γ
α β β β β β α
α β β β β β α μ
α β β β β β
− −
+ +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + + + + +
′ ′ ′ ′ ′′+ + + + +
′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′+ + + + +
= + + −
= + − +
= + 1 1 2)t t it i itAβ α μ+ + +′′+ +−
 
In the model of itY , the term in the parentheses is likely to be related to iα  and itA . So 
are those in the models of 1itY +  and 2itY + . The three terms in the parentheses of 
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Equations 4.9, unfortunately, are left out in the error term in the fixed-effects analyses, 
and, therefore, violate the exogeneity assumption. This is a limitation of this strategy.  
4.2.4 Dynamic Models 
The violation of the exogeneity assumption in the fixed-effects model is in 
part caused by the fixed-term iα . The first-difference estimator may better estimate 
asset effects than the fixed-effects estimator because the former can control for 
unobserved effects without imposing a fixed term. Approximately, the first difference 
estimation of asset effects for children can be expressed as follows: 
1 1 1
1 1 1
( ) ( )     t t tt t t
t t t
Y Y A A or
Y A
β ε ε
β ε
+ + +
+ + +
− = − + −
Δ = Δ + Δ    (4.10) 
Where 1tY +Δ  is the difference of 1tY +  and tY ,  and 1tA +Δ is the difference between 1tA +  
and tA . This expression of the first-difference estimation, however, shows an 
inconsistency from the conceptual estimation of asset effects for children in Equations 
4.3. To take the first difference in Equations 4.3 with the assumption of t t tβ β β′ ′′= = , 
the obtained equation should be as follows: 
1 1 1 1t t t tY Aβ ε+ + + +Δ = + Δ′    (4.11) 
The key difference is that Equations 4.10 uses 1tA +Δ but Equation 4.11 uses 1tA +  as the 
main predictor. The former suggests that changes in the child outcome measure 
between age t and t+1 is caused by changes in household assets between the two time 
periods. The latter, however, suggests that all assets at time t+1 are responsible for the 
improvement or decline of child outcome at time t+1. Since household assets have 
cumulative effects on child well-being, there is no need to assume that only asset 
difference or new assets are important.  
 The limitations of the fixed-effects and first-difference models indicate the 
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dynamics on child outcomes which, however, is not made explicit in Equations 4.3. 
For example, it is relatively easy to see that the models of 2tY +  and 1tY +  in Equations 
4.3 include all the terms used by the model of 1tY +  and tY , respectively. Therefore, a 
different approach to this idea in Equations 4.3 is 
1
1 1
2 2
1
2 1
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t t
t t
t
tt
t t
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A
A
Y Y
Y Y
Y Y
δ β
δ β
δ β
−
+ +
+ +
+
+ +
+
′ ′+
′′ ′′+
=
=
=
  (4.12) 
Child outcomes at age t are determined by child outcomes at age t-1 and household 
assets at age t. Equations 4.12 clearly show the dynamic relationships between child 
outcomes over time and their interactions with household assets. The dynamic panel 
data can be estimated by the Arellano-Bond estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991). 
Simply put, this estimator uses the difference of first difference in the dependent 
variable as an instrument variable. For example, 2 1 1[( ) ( )]t t t tY Y Y Y+ + +− − −  is an 
instrumental variable for 1tY +  in the model of 2tY + . Unfortunately, this method works 
only for observations in the last wave of the CDS because it requires information from 
the two previous waves. The same method cannot be applied to the data in the first 
and second waves because this requirement cannot be satisfied.  
FIGURE 4.3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Allison (2009) discusses a method to estimate the dynamic fixed-effects model 
in the framework of Structural Equations Modeling (SEM). The key of this method is 
to allow an estimation of the correlation between the independent variable (such as 
assets) at the current stage and the error term of the dependent variable at the previous 
stage. The fourth empirical strategy adopts this method suggested by Allison (2009), 
and Figure 4.3 shows an elaboration of this method; the study sample for this strategy 
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is the same as that in fixed-effects analyses. Not a measurement model here, the latent 
variable iα  in Figure 4.3 corresponds to the individual fixed term in Equations 4.7. 
Different from the fixed-effects model, Figure 4.3 also estimates 1tb +  (correlation 
between tε and 1tA + ) and 2tb +  (correlation between 1tε + and 2tA + ). The model in Figure 
4.3 can also be demonstrated in Equations 4.13. Detailed information on this strategy 
can be found in Appendix B.  
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4.3 Summary 
Proposing an empirical model of cumulative asset effects in Equations 4.3, 
this chapter discusses four empirical strategies to test asset effects for children with 
disabilities. In the first set of analyses, the study focuses on the effects of household 
assets measured before childbirth. The second set of analyses categorizes the sample 
used in the first strategy into multiple groups according to the propensity score of 
household assets. The first two strategies are essentially analyses based on a cross-
sectional design. The third and fourth strategies then utilize the three-wave 
longitudinal data from the PSID-CDS. The third set of analyses applies the fixed-
effects model to control for time-invariant unobserved factors when estimating asset 
effects for children with disabilities. The final analyses further test asset effects for 
children in the dynamic model using Structural Equations Modeling (SEM). Four 
strategies are developed with two considerations: (1) to address key confounding 
factors using various methods, and (2) to include in analyses household assets 
measured at different time periods. Results of analyses using these different strategies 
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can be compared, which may offer insights into how asset effects change over the 
course of child development.  
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Chapter 5: Results of Cross-Sectional Analyses 
This chapter discusses results of cross-sectional analyses in the first two 
strategies (results are also summarized in Table 5.1). These two strategies use assets 
measured before childbirth to avoid simultaneous effects between household assets 
and child outcomes, and to avoid interactions between household assets and children’s 
characteristics or services they received. The second strategy further applies 
propensity score classification to tackle the potential confoundedness of household 
assets and household background variables. The analyses are conducted on ten 
imputed datasets created by the multiple imputation procedure (MI)12, and are 
weighted using the weight variable provided by the PSID. Each imputed dataset has 
732 observations.  
TABLE 5.1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Overall, assets have expected associations with children’s educational and 
health outcomes in the first set of analyses. As summarized in Table 5.1, net worth is 
positively related to the applied problems score and the broad reading score, and 
negatively associated with children’s school suspension or expulsion. Children living 
in households with more liquid assets are less likely to repeat a grade or have school 
suspension or expulsion. Household assets also have positive associations with 
children’s global health status and are associated with reduced numbers of school 
days missed due to physical illness, hospitalization, and doctor visits for physical 
illness. The asset-health outcome association is consistently supported across different 
asset measures (continuous vs. categorical), asset types (net worth vs. liquid assets), 
and dependent variables. Health outcomes appear to be better measures than 
                                                 
12 I also conducted analyses on the original dataset without imputation. The results on 
the original data through listwise deletion are similar to those from imputed datasets.  
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educational outcomes in testing asset effect for children with disabilities. The findings, 
especially those of categorical asset measures, also show that non-linear relationships 
between assets and child outcomes can be identified when the amount of assets 
exceeds certain thresholds.  
The second set of analyses confirms the hypothesized asset effects on global 
health status, school days missed due to illness, and the likelihood of hospitalization 
for children with disabilities. These findings are consistent across different asset types 
(net worth vs. liquid assets) and asset measures (continuous vs. categorical). By 
comparing the results between groups with high and low expected asset values, the 
second strategy also finds that household assets show greater influences in the group 
with low expected asset values.  
5.1 Descriptive Results 
TABLE 5.2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 5.2 reports descriptive statistics of the variables in this study. Children 
in the sample are 12 years old on average in 2002. More than half of them are male, 
and two out of every ten are black. Reported by primary caregivers, about 60% of 
children have a disability condition in 1997 and 80% in 2002. Main disability types 
among these children are hearing difficulty, seeing difficulty, learning disability, and 
ADD/ADHD. Nearly 30% of children have special education experiences. In 2001, 
6% of these children do not have any medical insurance, and one-fourth are covered 
by government-provided programs (i.e., Medicaid, state-sponsored program, or 
military health care). Since very few children are covered by private insurance plans, 
they are grouped together with those who have employer-provided insurance plans 
(71%).  
At the time when household assets are measured, 80% of households are led 
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by males, and nearly 80% of household heads are employed. The mean household 
size and number of children are 3.4 and 1.3. A proportion of households in the sample 
receive public assistance, such as Food Stamps (21%), AFDC (37%), and SSI (31%). 
The average household income in the previous five years is less than $30,000.13 At 
the time when child outcomes are observed (2002), the mean age of children’s 
mothers is 38, and about 70% of them are married. More than half of these mothers 
have some college.  
For educational outcomes, the mean standardized scores of the applied 
problems test and the broad reading test are 102. About one-sixth of children have 
repeated a grade.  Similarly, one-sixth of children have been suspended or expelled 
from school. Regarding health outcomes, half of the primary caregivers report 
children having excellent health. On average, children have 3.4 school days missed 
due to physical illness and 2.4 doctor visits for illness in the previous 12 months. 
Nearly 40% of children have seen a psychiatrist, psychologist, doctor, or counselor 
about an emotional, mental, or behavior problem. In the last five years, the average 
number of hospitalization is .28. The maximum number of school days missed, doctor 
visits for illness, and hospitalization is 55, 20, and 60, respectively. 
The mean and median of household net worth in the sample are $64,000 and 
$12,000, respectively. Five percent of households have zero net worth, while one-
sixth have a net worth value below zero. Households with net worth from $0-$10,000, 
$10,001-$40,000, and above $40,000 take 28%, 24%, and 30% of the sample, 
respectively. The mean ($21,243) and median ($1,600) of household liquid assets are 
substantially smaller than those of net worth. About 20% of households have no liquid 
                                                 
13 Household economic resources are not inflation-adjusted in analyses. The 
inflation-adjusted measures of household economic resources (income and assets) do 
not generate different results in sensitivity tests. 
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assets whatsoever, and one out of every four households has liquid assets in the range 
of $1-$1,000. Twenty-seven percent of children live in households with liquid assets 
ranging from $1,001 to $10,000, and another 27% own liquid assets greater than 
$10,000. Table 5.2 describes the distribution of each parenting variable. More than 
60% of parents expect their children to finish at least a four-year college.  
 5.2 Household Assets and Educational Outcomes 
TABLES 5.3 AND 5.4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Sections 5.2 and 5.3 discuss results of the first empirical strategy. Tables 5.3 
and 5.4 report the regression coefficients and their significance of major variables in 
the five models (see the discussion of model specifications in Chapter 4). OLS 
regression is applied to the continuous educational outcomes (the applied problems 
score and the broad reading score); Probit regression is conducted for the 
dichotomous outcome measures (children’s experiences of repeating a grade, school 
suspension or expulsion, and doctor visits for emotional problems); and Negative 
Binomial regression is used for the count outcome measures (number of school days 
missed, hospitalization, doctor visits for physical illness). Results for the control 
variables have expected directions and are discussed briefly in Chapter 7. The full 
results can be requested from the author of the dissertation.   
5.2.1 Applied Problems Score  
The baseline model (Model 1, See Panel A of Table 5.3) includes only the 
five-year average of household income and other control variables. Household 
average income is positively and significantly related to children’s applied problems 
scores (b=3.75, p<.05); a 100% increase in income raises the score by 
3.75*log(2)=2.6 points. The income variable remains significant in other models, but 
its regression coefficient (b=2.95, p<.1) reduces by 25% when asset variables and 
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parenting behavior variables are added. 
Log-transformed net worth, however, does not have a significant association 
with children’s applied problems scores. When net worth is categorized into four 
groups, children with the highest level of net worth (>$40,000) have applied problems 
scores significantly greater than those with net worth in the ranges of $0-10,000 and 
$10,001-$40,000 (b=5.40, p<.1, see Model 3). To practically interpret this five-point 
difference, the finding can be compared to income effects. To lift the applied 
problems score by five points, household income should increase by nearly 200%. 
This amount of change in income does not seem likely because income is a “flow” 
variable, and household human capital tends to be fixed in the short term. The second 
approach is to compare the estimated asset effects on the applied problems score with 
the score gap between the CDS children who have finished high school and those who 
have not. Table 5.5 reports the means of two WJ-R test scores by the educational 
attainment of the PSID-CDS children.14 It shows that the CDS children who have 
finished high school have the applied problems score five points higher than those 
who have not.  
TABLE 5.5 ABOUT HERE 
 
As suggested in Model 3 with the categorical measure of net worth, children 
living in households with negative net worth have higher scores than those in the 
reference group ($0-$10,000), but the difference is not statistically significant. 
Negative net worth may indicate households have access to the credit market. These 
households may be better off than zero-net-worth households with borrowing 
                                                 
14 The statistics in Table 5.5 only include the CDS children who are 18 years old and 
above in 2007. 
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constraints (Nam & Huang, 2009; Zhan & Sherraden, 2010).  
FIGURE 5.1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The insignificance of net worth in Models 2 and 4 may be due to the fact that 
this continuous measure fails to capture the nonlinear relationship between net worth 
and the applied problems score. Based on the estimation from Models 2 and 3, Figure 
5.1 plots the predicted applied problem score by net worth for a typical child in the 
sample.15 The top of the vertical dotted lines represents the predicted applied 
problems score by the categorical measure of net worth; the predicted applied 
problems score is 106.8, 103.7, 103.7, and 109.1, respectively, for the four net worth 
groups from low to high. The solid black line is the predicted score by continuous net 
worth (log-transformed), and the predicted score is nearly the same across different 
net worth values, ranging from 105.3 to 105.7. Comparing these two estimates, it 
seems clear that the continuous measure is not able to capture the U-shape 
relationship between household assets and the dependent variable.16 The U-shape 
trend makes the slope of the solid line close to 0.  
Among the four hypothesized mediators, parental involvement in child 
development and parents’ educational expectations are positively related to children’s 
math scores. In Model 5, one point increase in parental involvement suggests an 
increase of 0.7 points in the applied problems score (b=.73, p<.05). Parents’ 
expectations for children to have an education at a four-year college and above are 
                                                 
15 A typical child has all control variables defined at their median values. Please see 
Table 5.2 for these variables’ median values.  
 
16 It is important to note that both measures, log-transformation and four categorical 
levels, are arbitrary without theoretical support.    
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associated with a 6-point gain in the score (b=5.58, p<.05).17 The directions of these 
results are consistent with previous studies (e.g., Zhan, 2006). However, to include 
parenting behavior variables hardly changes the regression coefficient of net worth. 
The proposed mediation mechanism is not supported.  
Table 5.4 replaces net worth with liquid assets and homeownership. Results of 
control variables are consistent (Full results can be requested from the author of the 
dissertation). Homeownership is positively but not significantly related to children’s 
applied problem scores. However, in the models with the categorical measure of 
liquid asset, children living in households with zero liquid assets (the lowest category) 
show the highest average score on the applied problems test, nearly six points greater 
than that for the second lowest category ($1-$1,000). Those with liquid assets ranging 
from $1,001-$10,000 (the second highest category) have the lowest score. Figure 5.2 
illustrates the trend of liquid asset effects for a typical child in the sample. Due to the 
nonlinear nature of asset effects, the asset effect hypothesis may or may not be 
supported depending on which distribution segment is under examination.  
FIGURE 5.2 ABOUT HERE 
 
What is puzzling is that the lowest liquid asset category ($0) actually has the 
highest predicted score. In the case that children with negative net worth have 
relatively high scores, a possible explanation is that their families may have access to 
the credit market, but it is not clear why children with zero liquid assets have the 
highest score. Different model specifications are tested by adding other asset 
measures, such as the total unsecured debt value, home value, home equity value, and 
                                                 
17 While parents’ educational expectation is measured in 1997 and the applied 
problem score is in 2002, it is possible that there is a two-way causality between these 
two variables.   
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even total net worth value18 in the model, respectively. Results of liquid assets do not 
change significantly. Another possibility is that there is measurement error in liquid 
assets, which causes the unexpected results discussed above. For instance, some 
households do not report accurate information regarding their liquid assets. Those 
having a value zero on the liquid assets measure report a lower value than what it 
actually is.  
5.2.2. Broad Reading Score 
Results on children’s broad reading scores (see Panel B of Tables 5.3 and 5.4) 
are consistent with those on the applied problems scores, and therefore are briefly 
discussed here. Children in households with the highest net worth category (>$40,000) 
have broad reading scores five points higher than those with net worth from $0 to 
$10,000 (b=5.17, p<.05, Model 3). Again this five-point difference is equal to the 
score gap between those who have finished high school and those who have not (see 
Table 5.5). If educational or cognitive achievement is an important determinant of 
high school dropouts, the effect size of household assets is substantial.  
Children in households with liquid assets from $1 to $1,000 have the lowest 
broad reading score, and those with zero liquid assets instead have the highest score. 
The difference between these two groups is 7.48 (p<.05, Model 3). An interesting 
finding here is that parental warmth is negatively associated with children’s reading 
scores.  
5.2.3 Repeated Grades 
Panel C of Table 5.3 focuses on the net worth measures; none of the reported 
variables has a statistically significant association with the outcome measure of 
                                                 
18 When total net worth value is controlled for, the model is testing the association 
between liquid assets and the applied problems score given that households have the 
same level of net worth.  
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repeating a grade. However, children living in households with liquid assets in the 
range of $1-$1,000 are most likely to repeat a grade (Panel C of Table 5.4); the 
differences between this and other three categories are all statistically significant. On 
one hand, it suggests that children are more likely to repeat a grade when household 
liquid assets increase from $0 to $1-$1,000 (b=.55, p<.05). This finding is puzzling. 
On the other hand, it shows that, excluding those with zero liquid assets, the more 
liquid assets households have, the less likely children are to repeat a grade. To include 
parenting variables does not change the results of household assets. 
FIGURE 5.3 ABOUT HERE 
 
To show the effect size of liquid assets for a typical child, the predicted 
probability of repeating a grade by the level of liquid assets is plotted in Figure 5.3. 
All the four categories have relatively low probabilities (from 2.3% to 10%). However, 
a comparison of these categories suggests the importance of liquid assets: children in 
households with $1-$1000 liquid assets have a predicted probability of repeating a 
grade about three times higher than those with liquid assets in the two highest liquid 
asset categories.  
5.2.4 School Suspension or Expulsion 
FIGURE 5.4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Analyses of children’s school suspension or expulsion show a different pattern 
in the results. First, the continuous measure of net worth becomes statistically 
significant and is negatively related to the probability of school suspension or 
expulsion (b=-.03, p<.05). As displayed in Figure 5.4, this result is caused by an 
explicit negative association between net worth and school suspension or expulsion. A 
comparison of those with negative and positive net worth can show this more clearly. 
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For the categorical net worth measure, children in households with negative net worth 
are statistically more likely to experience school suspension or expulsion than other 
children (b=.48, p<.05, Model 3). Those with negative net worth are about two times 
more likely to experience school suspension or expulsion than others. Among the four 
parental behavior variables, only parental involvement reduces children’s probability 
of school suspension or expulsion (b=-.10, p<.05, Model 5).  
FIGURE 5.5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Results of liquid assets tell a different story. The continuous liquid asset 
measure does not have a significant relationship with the outcome measure. For the 
categorical one, the category of $1-$1,000 is related to the highest likelihood of 
school suspension (28% in Figure 5.5), statistically different from the other two liquid 
asset categories ($0 and $1,001-$10,000). The N-shape effects of liquid assets 
displayed in Figure 5.5 provide an explanation of why the continuous liquid asset 
measure does not have a significant association with this outcome measure. But 
substantively it is not clear why there is an N-shape liquid asset effect. The outcome 
difference between the two categories, $1-$1,000 and $1,001-$10,000, is not 
statistically significant after controlling for parenting behavior variables, which may 
support the proposed mediation mechanism.   
To sum up the results regarding the educational outcomes in the first empirical 
strategy, the categorical measure of net worth has expected association with all 
educational outcomes except repeated grades. The continuous net worth measure is 
statistically significant only in the analyses of school suspension or expulsion. The 
hypothesis that high liquid assets are associated with low probability of repeating a 
grade and school suspension or expulsion is partially supported depending on which 
distribution segment is examined. An unexpected finding is that, compared to the 
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other groups, children with zero liquid assets do not have the worst performance, as 
indicated by these educational outcomes, and, surprisingly, they even have the highest 
scores on two WJ-R tests. This result could be caused by the measurement error in 
liquid assets, especially for those reporting zero liquid assets. The hypothesized 
mediation mechanism of asset effects through parenting behavior variables is not 
supported except for one analysis of school suspension or expulsion.  
5.3 Household Assets and Health Outcomes 
Tables 5.6 (net worth) and 5.7 (liquid assets) describe the relationships 
between household assets and health outcomes of children with disabilities in the first 
empirical strategy.  
TABLES 5.6 AND 5.7 ABOUT HERE 
 
5.3.1 Global Health Measure 
Results on the continuous net worth fail to support the hypothesis of asset 
effects on the global health. In Model 3 for the categorical measure, parents with net 
worth above $10,000 are more likely to report “excellent health” for their children 
(b=.33, p<.1 for net worth from $10,001-$40,000 and b=.41, p<.05 for net worth 
greater than $40,000). None of the parental behavior variables shows a significant 
association with children’s global health status. Theoretically, parents’ educational 
expectations can be excluded from the analyses of health outcomes, but they are still 
kept in these models for the purpose of comparing analyses of health outcomes and 
educational outcomes.  
FIGURE 5.6 ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 5.6 displays the predicted probability of reporting excellent health by 
net worth for a typical child in the sample. The probability of having excellent health 
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is .66, .63, .75, and .77, respectively, for the four net worth categories. If households 
have net worth more than $10,000, the likelihood of reporting excellent health (75%) 
is about 10% higher than those with net worth less than $10,000.  
FIGURE 5.7 ABOUT HERE 
 
Results are even stronger when household net worth is replaced with liquid 
assets. Both log-transformed liquid assets (b=.06, p<.01) and the categorical liquid 
asset measure (b=.63, .39, and .69, respectively, for three liquid asset groups, p<.1) 
are positively associated with children’s global health status. Figure 5.7 plots the 
predicted probability of having excellent health by liquid assets. It suggests that the 
positive slope of the continuous liquid asset measure mainly captures the difference 
between households with zero liquid assets and those with positive liquid assets. A 
comparison of Figures 5.6 and 5.7 indicates that liquid assets have larger impacts on 
children’s global health status than net worth. For instance, the predicted probability 
of children having excellent health is 63% for households with net worth $1-$10,000, 
but is 75% (the mean of 78% and 71%) for those with liquid assets $1-$10,000.  
5.3.2 School Days Missed due to Illness  
FIGURE 5.8 ABOUT HERE 
 
In Panel B of Table 5.6, an increase in net worth decreases the number of 
school days missed due to physical illness (b=-.02 for the continuous measure, p<.05; 
b=-.35 and -.56 for the two top net worth categories, p<.05). As predicted from the 
continuous net worth measure, the number of school days missed is from 3.4 to 2.9 
(see Figure 5.8). Results regarding the categorical net worth measure indicate a 
greater effect: the number of school days missed for the lowest net worth group (3.3 
days) is about 1.7 times of that for the highest net worth group (1.8 days).  
48
 
FIGURE 5.9 ABOUT HERE 
 
Analyses of liquid assets yield similar findings (see Figure 5.9). Liquid assets, 
either continuous (b=-.05, p<.05) or categorical (b=-.42, p<.05 for the highest-liquid-
asset group), reduce children’s school days missed due to physical illness. For the 
same outcome variable, liquid assets have greater influences than net worth. At the 
level of $1,000, the predicted number of school days missed is 3.2 for net worth and is 
2.6 for liquid assets. 
5.3.3 Hospitalization 
FIGURES 5.10 AND 5.11 ABOUT HERE 
 
The frequency of hospitalization in the previous five years decreases when 
parents’ net worth increases (b=-.04, p<.1, Model 2 in Panel C, Table 5.6). In the 
analyses using the categorical net worth measure, asset effects are mainly reflected in 
the difference in the frequency of hospitalization between the highest category of net 
worth and the other categories (b=-.79, p<.1, Model 3). As expected, the predicted 
frequency of hospitalization is very small (from .02 to .06 in Figure 5.10) since 
hospitalization rarely happens. Although the absolute frequency is extremely low, the 
relative effects across different levels of net worth are substantial. Children in the 
lowest net worth group (<$0) are hospitalized three times more than those in the 
highest net worth group (>$40,000).  
It is somehow unexpected that parental warmth is statistically and positively 
related to children’s hospitalization in Models 4 and 5, possibly because children’s 
health services may affect parental warmth. Children who are more likely to be 
hospitalized also receive more attention from parents. Finally, similar to net worth, 
liquid assets reduce the number of children’s hospitalization (b=-.19, p<.01 for the 
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continuous measure; b=-.83, -2.38, and -1.80, p<.05 for the three liquid asset groups; 
see Panel C in Table 5.7 and Figure 5.11). As indicated in Figures 5.10 and 5.11, the 
marginal effects of liquid assets seem greater than those of net worth.  
5.3.4 Doctor Visits for Illness 
FIGURE 5.12 ABOUT HERE 
 
Results of doctor visits due to physical illness show the same pattern as those 
of school days missed due to physical illness, probably because both outcome 
measures are related to children’s physical illness. Reported in Panel D of Table 5.6, 
the continuous (b=-.02, p<.1) and categorical (b=-.28 and b=-.51 for the two highest-
net-worth groups, p<.1) net worth measures are negatively related to the number of 
doctor visits for physical illness. Compared to children in the reference category of 
net worth (see Figure 5.12), the number of doctor visits due to physical illness in the 
last 12 months is 90% higher if households have negative net worth, and is 10% lower 
if households have net worth in the highest category ($40,000). Liquid assets are 
negatively linked to children’s doctor visits for illness (b=-.06, p<.05 for the 
continuous measure; b=-.37 and b=-.44 for the two highest-liquid-asset groups, p<.1, 
see Panel D in Table 5.7), and seem to be more important on the number of children’s 
doctor visits than net worth.  
FIGURE 5.13 ABOUT HERE 
 
5.3.5 Doctor Visits for Emotional Problems 
Doctor visits for emotional problems are measured by a dichotomous indicator 
(Yes/No). None of the variables listed in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 has statistically 
significant impacts on children’s probability of doctor visits for emotional problems 
in the preceding 12 months.  
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To sum up, in the first empirical strategy, household assets have expected 
effects on almost all health outcomes for children with disabilities except doctor visits 
for emotional problems. These findings are consistent across different asset types (net 
worth vs. liquid assets) and different measurement of assets (continuous vs. 
categorical). In general, asset effects on health outcomes estimated from liquid assets 
or categorical measures are greater than those from net worth or continuous measures. 
5.4 Average Asset Effects after Propensity Score Classification 
Sections 5.4 and 5.5 report the estimated asset effects after propensity score 
classification. More detail about the procedure of propensity score classification is 
provided in Appendix A. Only Models 2 and 3 in the first set of analyses are used 
since Models 4 and 5 fail to provide evidence of the proposed mediation mechanism 
(through parenting behavior variables). The continuous asset measures are tested in 
Model 2, and the categorical asset measures are tested in Model 3. In addition, several 
dependent variables (frequency of school days missed, hospitalization, and doctor 
visits for physical illness) are recoded into dichotomous ones (having frequencies 
greater than 0=1 and otherwise=0) in order for Probit regression to be applied. It 
becomes more difficult for Negative binomial models to be converged after 
propensity score classification.  
TABLES 5.8 AND 5.9 ABOUT HERE 
 
First, as shown in Tables 5.8 and 5.9, the regression coefficients of log-
transformed net worth have the expected direction, but none of them is statistically 
significant. This is different from results of the first set of analyses in Sections 5.2 and 
5.3, in which log-transformed net worth is statistically and negatively related to 
school suspension or expulsion, school days missed due to illness, and frequency of 
hospitalization and doctor visits for illness.  
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Results on the categorical net worth measure are somewhat different from 
those of the continuous measure. Children living in households with the highest level 
of net worth (>$40,000) are more likely to report having excellent health (b=.57, 
p<.1), less likely to miss school due to illness (b=-.99, p<.01), and less likely to have 
been hospitalized in the previous five years (b=-.97, p<.01). The regression 
coefficients of the categorical measures of net worth in the models of school days 
missed and hospitalization, however, cannot be compared with those in the first set of 
analyses because they are different regression models (Probit in the second set vs. 
Negative binomial in the first set). The regression coefficient of net worth in the 
model of global health status (b=.57) is slightly higher than that in Table 5.6 (b=.41). 
Findings regarding net worth are well supported by the analyses on liquid 
assets. The significant associations between net worth and health outcomes are also 
confirmed in the analyses using liquid assets. Household liquid assets are positively 
related to the probability of reporting excellent health and are negatively associated 
with the likelihood of school days missed due to physical illness and hospitalization. 
Furthermore, the associations between liquid assets and outcome measures appear 
even stronger. For example, the continuous liquid asset measure shows a significant 
association with each of these outcome measures, but the continuous net worth 
measure does not. In terms of the categorical measures, not only children in the 
highest liquid asset group (>$10,000) but also those in the second highest liquid asset 
group ($1,000-$10,000) have better health outcomes.  
A comparison of the first two sets of analyses suggests that asset effects for 
children with disabilities may be better reflected in health outcomes, such as global 
health status, school days missed, and hospitalization. Two empirical strategies 
generate consistent findings on these outcomes. In addition, these analyses, especially 
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the ones using the categorical asset measures, confirm that asset effects are nonlinear. 
For future research, it is important to identify the thresholds of asset effects to inform 
the development of asset-based policies. 
5.5 Average Asset Effects for Subsamples 
In fact, the average asset effects for the entire sample reported in Tables 5.8 
and 5.9 are an aggregation of those in the three groups—households with high-, mid-, 
and low-expected assets (see Appendix A and Figure A.1). Asset effects for each of 
these groups are worth a closer examination as well. For asset-based policy to be 
inclusive (that is, to include low-income and low-wealth population in asset 
accumulation), it seems particularly important to examine asset effects for those with 
low-expected assets. With this consideration, this section investigates the average 
asset effects for those with high- and low-expected assets, respectively.  
TABLE 5.10 ABOUT HERE 
 
As shown in Table 5.9 above, liquid assets show stronger associations with 
health outcomes than net worth does. For simplicity, Table 5.10 lists only the results 
of liquid assets on three health outcomes for the groups of high- and low-expected 
assets. For the categorical measure of liquid assets, Table 5.10 only reports the 
regression coefficients of the highest-liquid-asset group (>$10,000).  
First, the regression coefficient of liquid assets is greater in the low-expected 
asset group than that in the high-expected asset group, indicating greater asset effects 
for the group of low-expected assets. For example, in the analysis of hospitalization 
using the log-transformed liquid assets, the regression coefficient for the low-
expected asset group is five times that in the high-expected group (b=-.15 vs. b=-.03). 
Since the estimated standard error is about the same for the two groups, asset effects 
are more likely to be statistically different from 0 in the low-expected asset group. 
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Neither the continuous nor the categorical measure of liquid assets is statistically 
significant in the high-expected asset group. However, several significant associations 
are identified in the low-expected group. In addition, the p value is close to the .1 
level for the categorical liquid asset measure in the models of school days missed and 
hospitalization for the low-expected group. A comparison of asset effects between the 
high- and low-expected asset groups suggests that it is efficient for asset-based 
policies to focus on low-income and low-wealth families.  
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Chapter 6: Results of Longitudinal Analyses 
This chapter focuses on the three-wave longitudinal data analyses using fixed-
effects models and structural equations modeling (SEM), in which each CDS child 
with a disability has three observations (ideally). Educational and health outcomes are 
measured in the three CDS waves (1997, 2002, and 2007), and household assets are 
measured in 1994, 1999, and 2003, respectively (see Table 4.1 for details). Different 
from the first set of analyses, for most of the participants in the sample, assets are not 
measured before childbirth.19 Also different from the second one intended to control 
for the “observed” confounders, longitudinal analyses control for unobserved or 
unmeasured time-invariant factors.  
TABLE 6.1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The analyses are conducted on the ten imputed datasets created from the 
multiple imputation procedure (MI),20 and are weighted using the weight variable 
provided by the PSID. Each imputed dataset has 1,065 children and 3,195 (=1065*3) 
observations. The real sample size is not balanced, however. It varies depending on (1) 
whether the child is interviewed in a specific wave; (2) whether the child is eligible 
for certain survey questions on outcome measures; and (3) whether the child has 
different responses to the same measure in the three waves. For instance, 122 (out of 
1,065) children are not interviewed in the CDS Wave II due to the change of survey 
eligibility and another 500 children aged out of the CDS Wave III. Only children 
older than three years can take the WJ-R tests, and only those older than five years 
could have the experience of repeating a grade or school suspension. Since fixed-
                                                 
19 Children born between 1995 and 1997 have the first asset measure before 
childbirth.  
 
20 I also conducted analyses on the original dataset without imputation. 
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effects analysis does not allow time-invariant dependent variables, children who give 
the same response on the outcome measure in all three waves have to be excluded 
from analysis.  
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
TABLE 6.2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 6.2 reports the descriptive statistics from fixed-effects analyses. 
Consistent with the first study sample used in Chapter 5, children with disabilities 
have a mean age of 12 years. Pooling all observations together, about 26% of them 
have special education experiences, and about 50% have disability conditions.   
When household asset measures are observed, 82% of household heads are 
employed. The mean household size and number of children are 4.2 and 2.09, 
respectively, greater than those in the first strategy. The difference indicates the 
changes of household composition in 15 years. Households receiving public 
assistance in this sample are not as many as those in Chapter 5 (i.e., Food Stamp: 17% 
vs. 21%, AFDC/TANF: 7% vs. 37%, and SSI: 6% vs. 31%), in part due to the drastic 
policy change after the 1996 welfare reform and in part due to improved family 
economic status in mid-adulthood. Compared to the sample used for the first strategy, 
the average income ($61,696 vs. $29,139) doubled in the 15 years largely due to 
income growth from young to mid adulthood of parents, macro economic 
development during this period, and inflation.  
The mean scores of the applied problems test and the broad reading test are 
102 and 100, respectively. About one-seventh observations have a positive response 
to the question of repeating a grade, and one-seventh have a positive response to the 
question of school suspension or expulsion. Table 6.2 also reports the percentage of 
children with dependent variables lacking within-subject variation over time. These 
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children will not be included in fixed-effects analyses (LM2 and LM3). Distributions 
of health outcomes in this sample are similar to those reported in Table 5.2.  
The mean of net worth rises from $64,000 (Table 5.2) to $176,000 (Table 6.2), 
which substantially changes the distribution of the categorical net worth measure. The 
mean of liquid assets increases even faster (four times), but, interestingly, the 
distribution of the categorical liquid assets is about the same for the two samples. This 
may indicate growing wealth inequality over the years. Increases in liquid assets 
mostly occur in a small group of households that already had relatively high liquid 
assets, and as a result, the categorical distribution does not show much change. 
6.2 Household Assets and Educational Outcomes 
Sections 6.2 and 6.3 report results of fixed-effects analyses. Model 
specification used for fixed-effects analyses is slightly different from that in the first 
set of analyses. First, the analyses remove control variables (such as child’s gender, 
race, and disability type) that show no or little change over time. Fixed-effects models 
cannot estimate coefficients of variables that have no within-subject variation. Second, 
some variables, while relevant, cannot be included in longitudinal analysis simply 
because they are not recorded in all CDS waves (e.g., types of health insurance for the 
PSID-CDS children).  
For each asset measure, three models are examined: LM1, LM2, and LM3 
(LM stands for Longitudinal Model). LM1 is a pooled cross-sectional baseline model 
that pools three observations of each child and runs a cross-sectional analysis directly 
regardless of the fact that they are from the same subject. LM2 is a fixed-effects 
analysis without including parenting behavior variables, and LM3 adds parenting 
behavior variables to LM2. Results of LM1 can be examined in comparison to those 
of the first strategy in Chapter 5 since both have the same cross-sectional estimator. 
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More comparison can be done with those from LM2 and LM3 to see whether fixed-
effects estimator has corrected any unobserved bias.   
Specifically, OLS regression is applied to the continuous outcome measures 
(the applied problems score and the broad reading score); Logit regression is 
conducted for the dichotomous outcome measures (repeated grade, school 
suspension/expulsion, global health, and doctor visits for emotional problems); and 
Poisson regression is used for the count outcome measures (frequency of school days 
missed, hospitalization, and doctor visits for illness). Logit and Poisson regressions 
for fixed-effects model are also called conditional Logit and conditional Poisson 
models. Different from the first strategy in Chapter 5, this strategy does not use Probit 
regression for the dichotomous outcome measures because the conditional Probit 
cannot be conducted. Neither does this strategy apply Negative Binomial regression 
for the count variable because it has been argued that the code to test Negative 
Binomial fixed-effects analysis in Stata is not a true conditional model (Allison, 2009). 
TABLES 6.3 AND 6.4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 demonstrate asset effects on educational outcomes for 
children with disabilities in fixed-effects analyses. Full results for the control 
variables can be requested from the author of the dissertation. Overall, household 
assets do not appear to be related to cognitive achievement or intellectual ability 
measured by two WJ-R test scores—the applied problems and the broad reading 
scores. However, household assets are more likely to affect school attainment. 
Children in households with more assets are less likely to repeat a grade or be 
suspended from school.  
6.2.1 Applied Problems and Broad Reading Scores (Continuous Variables) 
The pooled cross-sectional analyses (LM1 in Table 6.3) shows that the 
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increase in net worth strengthens children’s academic performance measured by the 
applied problems (b=.30, p<.05) and broad reading scores (b=.28, p<.05). This 
association appears only at the level of $40,000 and above for the categorical net 
worth measure in LM1. These results are similar to those in the first set of analyses: 
Log-transformed net worth in fixed-effects analyses shows greater effects probably 
because the measurement timing of assets is closer to that of the outcome measures in 
this sample.  
However, none of the net worth measures in fixed-effects analyses (LM2&3) 
shows a statistically significant association with the two test scores, although children 
in households with the highest net worth category (above $40,000) have better 
performance on both tests. In other words, after controlling for initial scores, any 
change in household assets is not related to the child’s later cognitive performance. 
Overall, fixed-effects analyses produce results consistent with those using propensity 
score classification (see Table 5.8). Among the parenting behavior variables of 
interest, parental stress negatively correlates with the applied problems score, and 
parents’ educational expectation of four-year college and above is positively related to 
the broad reading score. Analyses involving liquid assets yield the same results (see 
Table 6.4). 
6.2.2 Repeated Grades (Dichotomous Variable) 
The pooled cross-sectional analyses (LM1) of repeated grades again support 
the asset-effect hypothesis. Household asset holding contributes to a decreased 
probability of a child’s repeating a grade (b=-.05 for the continuous net worth 
measure, p<.05), especially for those with net worth above $40,000 (b=-.79, p<.05). 
This association is not supported in the first set of analyses (Table 5.3).  
Fixed-effects analyses (LM2&3 in Table 6.3) show stronger impacts of net 
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worth on repeated grades. The regression coefficient of log-transformed net worth 
increases from -.09 (p<.01) in LM2 to -.11 (p<.01) in LM3 when parenting behavior 
variables are entered. The estimation in LM2 with log-transformed net worth suggests 
that the odds of repeating a grade reduce by 6% when net worth doubles. In LM2 with 
the categorical net worth measure, the odds of repeating a grade for children in the 
reference category ($0-$10,000) are only one-fourth of those with negative net worth 
(b=1.48, p<.01), but 1.6 times greater than those in the highest net worth category 
(b=-.49, p<.05). What needs to be noted is that nearly 65% of children are excluded 
from the analyses because they have never repeated a grade. Therefore, the findings 
are only applicable to children included in the analyses.  
All parenting behavior variables except for parenting stress are negatively and 
statistically associated to a child’s likelihood to repeat a grade. Interestingly, net 
worth shows stronger effects when parenting behavior variables are entered, which 
contradicts the mediation hypothesis above. This may suggest an alternative 
hypothesis: given the same level of parenting, the more financial assets parents invest 
in child development, the better outcomes children achieve.  
The analyses on liquid assets (Table 6.4) provide consistent but slightly 
different results. First, when liquid assets increase by 100%, the odds of repeating a 
grade reduce by merely 4% (b=-.05 in LM2 with the continuous liquid assets, p<.05), 
smaller than the estimated effect of net worth. Second, for the categorical liquid asset 
measure, the highest category (above $10,000) does not show different odds from the 
reference category ($0). The two categories in the middle ($1-$1,000 and $1,001-
$10,000) instead have odds nearly 50% lower than those in the reference category 
(b=-.56 and b=-.61 in LM2, p<.01). Homeownership is also examined. When 
parenting behavior variables are controlled for, the regression coefficient of 
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homeownership almost doubles. In LM3, children from families owning a house have 
about 65% reduced odds of repeating a grade than children from families not owning 
a house (p<.01).   
6.2.3 School Suspension or Expulsion (Dichotomous Variable) 
Findings regarding this outcome measure are relatively simple. The analyses 
exclude about 55% of children because they have no experience of school suspension 
or expulsion. Fixed-effects analyses with the categorical net worth measure find that 
children from households with net worth from $10,001-$40,000 are less likely to 
experience school suspension or expulsion than those from households with net worth 
from $0-$10,000 (b=-.62, odds ratio=.54, p<.05). For the categorical liquid asset 
measure, this negative association only appears in the category of above $10,000 as 
compared to the reference category ($0), with a regression coefficient of -.78 (p<.01). 
Homeownership again is a significant factor protecting children from school 
suspension or expulsion. The odds of being suspended or expelled from school for 
children of homeowners are 40% lower (p<.01).  
6.3 Household Assets and Health Outcomes 
Fixed-effects results on net worth and health outcome, reported in Table 6.5, 
are similar to those in the first two sets of analyses. These results are discussed by 
each health outcome respectively below.  
TABLE 6.5 ABOUT HERE 
 
6.3.1 Global Health Status (Dichotomous Variable) 
Fixed-effects analyses show the odds of reporting excellent health increases by 
2% (b=.03, p<.05), when net worth doubles. It suggests that asset building may be 
more efficient for those with low wealth because it may be relatively easy to double a 
small value of net worth. For the categorical net worth measure, the reference group 
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($0-$10,000) has the lowest odds of reporting excellent health, which are 25%, 50%, 
and 60% lower than the negative net worth category, the category of $10,001-$40,000, 
and the category of above $40,000. The positive slope of the log-transformed net 
worth seems to capture mainly the growing trend of reporting excellent health from 
$0-$10,000; $10,001-$40,000; and above $40,000.  
Although all four parenting behavior variables are highly associated with 
children’s global health status, some of them have unexpected directions. For example, 
both parental warmth and parents’ educational expectations for children to have some 
college predict children’s global health negatively. This negative correlation may 
suggest a misspecification in analyses—parental warmth could be parents’ responses 
to children’s health status. However, it is still a puzzle as to why parents’ education 
expectation at the level of some college (as compared to the expectation of high 
school graduation) has a negative association with children’s global health status.  
TABLE 6.6 ABOUT HERE 
 
 Results of liquid assets show a greater marginal effect. When liquid assets are 
doubled, the odds of having excellent health increase by 4% (b=.06, p<.01). Therefore, 
households should be encouraged to accumulate liquid assets for the purpose of 
improving health. The mechanism of asset effects on health outcomes may be related 
to the liquidity of assets or service purchase.  
While it does not appear to be a significant predictor of outcome measures in 
the first two strategies, homeownership expands children’s opportunity to have 
excellent health, especially when parenting behavior variables are controlled for. 
Owning a home increases children’s odds of having excellent health by 30% (b=.31 
and b=.28 in two LM3s, p<.05). 
6.3.2 School Days Missed due to Illness (Count Variable) 
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The estimated effects (b=-.03, p<.05) of the log-transformed net worth on 
children’s school days missed due to illness are very close to those in the first strategy 
(b=-.02). However, this negative link is not supported by the analyses of the 
categorical net worth measure, in which not only the negative net worth category 
(b=.51, p<.01) but also the two other categories with higher net worth values (b=.29 
for $10,001-$40,000 and b=.40 for above $40,000, p<.01) have greater coefficients 
than the reference category ($0-$10,000). In other words, the reference category has 
the fewest school days missed. 
FIGURES 6.1 AND 6.2 ABOUT HERE 
 
To a large extent, this controversy has to do with the selection of the reference 
category of net worth. When the negative net worth category is chosen as the 
reference group, the other three categories all have a negative coefficient, statistically 
significant at the .1 level (see Figure 6.1). Then, the findings do not conflict with 
those from the continuous measure. The negative slope for the log-transformed net 
worth reflects the difference in school days missed between children with negative 
and positive net worth.  
The predicted number of school days missed for a typical child is shown in 
Figure 6.1. A typical child in this analysis is defined as a CDS child who has the 
median on each control variable and -9 as his or her fixed term. The fixed term is the 
median value of the estimated individual heterogeneity taken from the first imputed 
dataset. The solid line represents the predicted number of school days missed using 
the log-transformed net worth; the predicted number of days reduces from 1.7 to 1.5 
when net worth becomes positive. Missed school days as predicted from the 
categorical measure (the dot line) is very small (less than .5), and the negative 
category clearly has higher predicted numbers than all the other categories. It is worth 
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noting that the figures shown in this chapter are not directly comparable to those in 
Chapter 5 because the typical case varies and the fixed term is arbitrary.  
Figure 6.2 plots the predicted number of school days missed using liquid asset 
measures (see Table 6.6 for detailed results); it has a different pattern from Figure 6.1. 
First, as shown by the solid line, the continuous measure has a positive association 
with the number of school days missed (b=.03, p<.01), although its impact seems 
relatively small. For the categorical measure, the zero-liquid-asset group has the 
smallest number of school days missed, and the predicted number decreases when 
liquid assets fall into the highest category.  
Another important predictor is homeownership. Children of renters have the 
number of school days missed 1.2 times higher than that of children of homeowners 
(p<.1). This is consistent with the results of net worth measures (see Figure 6.1) given 
that home equity is generally a household’s most important asset. Homeownership 
may affect children’s health in a way different from that of liquid assets. For example, 
homeowners’ children may be less likely to be sick than children of renters. However, 
if children have physical illness, households with liquid assets may be more likely to 
take children from school for health services.  
6.3.3 Hospitalization (Count Variable) 
FIGURE 6.3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 6.3 displays the predicted frequency of hospitalization for a typical 
child with a fixed term of -.6. The negative coefficient of the log-transformed net 
worth (b=-.04, p<.01) mainly reflects the difference in hospitalization between those 
with positive and negative net worth. Using the typical case as an example, children 
with positive net worth have .49 times of hospitalization, 17% lower than those with 
negative net worth (.57). The relationship between net worth and children’s 
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hospitalization is not linear and clear-cut if net worth is measured by a four-category 
variable. In Table 6.6, children with disabilities stay in hospital less frequently if 
households have their own homes. Their frequency of hospitalization is only 80% of 
those in households not owning a home. Liquid assets, however, do not have the 
expected negative association with hospitalization.  
6.3.4 Doctor Visits for Illness (Count Variable) 
The analyses estimate a positive coefficient (b=.09, p<.01) for the net worth 
category of $10,001-$40,000, indicating that children’s doctor visits for illness may 
increase when net worth increases from the reference category of $0-$10,000 to the 
next category. A negative coefficient (b=-.06, p<.1) is generated for the category of 
$40,000 and above, suggesting fewer doctor visits for children in the highest net 
worth category. Results for liquid assets follow a similar pattern, in which children of 
households in the highest liquid asset category (above $10,000) are less likely to visit 
doctors for illness. In addition, children of homeowners visit doctor 16% more 
frequently than those of non-homeowners.  
6.3.5 Doctor Visits for Emotional Problems (Dichotomous Variable) 
The most interesting finding about this outcome is that net worth increases 
children’s likelihood to visit a professional for their mental, emotional, or behavioral 
problems. A 100% increase in net worth raises the odds of doctor visits for emotional 
problems by 5%. The odds ratios of the reference net worth category and the two 
higher categories are .71 (b=-.34, p<.01) and .26 (b=-1.34, p<.01), respectively. When 
parenting behavior variables are not included in the model, children in zero-liquid-
asset households are more likely to have doctor visits for emotional problems than 
children in the other two liquid asset categories: $1-$1,000 (b=-.28, p<.05) and above 
$10,000 (b=-.48, p<.01). The statistical significance of categorical liquid asset 
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variables disappears with the addition of parenting behavior variables. 
6.4. Results of SEM Analyses 
The fourth empirical strategy further tests asset effects on educational and 
health outcomes for children with disabilities using the three-wave longitudinal data 
in Structural Equations Models (SEMs). As a possible solution to the endogeneity 
issue in fixed-effects analyses, it may better capture the dynamic relationships 
between household assets and child outcomes. For each outcome measure, two 
models are conducted on the same sample used for fixed-effects analyses. The first 
model (SEM1) adds an individual heterogeneous term (similar to fixed-effects 
analyses) and correlates household assets with the error term of dependent variables at 
the previous stage. The second model specification (SEM2) does not have the 
individual heterogeneous term in analyses. Instead, SEM2 assumes a dynamic 
relationship between children’s outcomes over time and includes the first-order lag of 
the dependent variable in analyses. Appendix B provides detailed information of these 
two models.  
6.4.1. Net Worth and Child Outcomes 
TABLE 6.7 ABOUT HERE 
 
Results of net worth are summarized in Tables 6.7. I do not report model fit 
indices for these analyses because the study is mainly interested in the regression 
coefficients of asset measures.21 Results from SEM1 are reported in the first column, 
and those from SEM2 are in the second column. Each row represents a separate 
analysis for the continuous or categorical net worth measure. For example, for 
                                                 
21 As expected, the model fit indices are poor in these analyses for two reasons: On 
the one hand, the “measurement” model to estimate a fixed-effect term in SEM1 is 
not a true “measurement” model. On the other hand, many factors that may affect 
child well-being are not included in these analyses. 
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children’s applied problems scores, the estimated regression coefficients of log-
transformed net worth at the three waves in SEM1 are .04, -.13, and -.23, respectively. 
The table looks complicated as SEM analyses allow asset effects to vary in the three 
waves.  
First, net worth has expected positive effects on all education outcomes. For 
the two WJ-R test scores (applied problems and broad reading scores), asset effects 
are mainly reflected by the score difference between the highest net worth category 
and the other categories. Roughly, the former has a score three points higher than the 
other categories (p<.05), especially in CDS Waves II and III. Fixed-effects analyses in 
Table 6.3, however, do not find significant associations between net worth and 
children’s cognitive scores. This result may be caused by the assumption in fixed-
effects analyses that asset effects are homogeneous at different observational points. 
Second, children in the highest net worth category (>40,000) have a lower probability 
of repeating a grade at the second wave in SEM1. The results are not directly 
comparable with those from fixed-effects analyses because regression models are 
different (Probit vs. conditional Logit). Third, log-transformed net worth has a 
negative association with children’s experiences of school suspension or expulsion 
(b=-.03, p<.05).  
Two regression coefficients have directions opposite from the hypothesis of 
asset effects. In SEM1, the negative net worth category has higher broad reading 
scores (b=2.5, p<.1) than the reference category ($0-$10,000) at the second wave, and 
the category of $10,001-$40,000 has a higher probability of repeating a grade than the 
category of $0-$10,000.  
SEM analyses and fixed-effects analyses generate similar findings regarding 
the positive association between net worth and children’s global health status. As a 
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note to this, the significant association is found only in the two highest categories at 
the first wave. Technically, this finding should be explained with caution because, due 
to the data limitation, the correlation between asset measures at the first wave and the 
error term of outcome measures at the previous stage cannot be specified. In other 
words, there is a possibility of overestimation regarding the results of asset measures 
at the first wave.  
SEM1 does not find net worth to be significantly associated with the other 
health outcomes. The dynamic models (SEM2) indicate that (1) the highest net worth 
category has a higher propensity of missing school due to physical illness at the 
second wave; (2) the log-transformed net worth reduces children’s occurrence of 
hospitalization at the third wave; and (3) net worth is positively linked to children’s 
likelihood of visiting professionals for emotional and behavioral problems at the first 
wave. Overall, these results confirm the findings from fixed-effects analyses.  
6.4.2 Liquid Assets and Child Outcomes 
TABLE 6.8 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 6.8 reports the results of SEM analyses of liquid assets and child 
outcomes. Findings regarding liquid assets are comparable to those on net worth 
except for two minor differences. First, liquid assets are not associated with children’s 
experiences of repeating a grade. Second, both measures of liquid asset (continuous 
and categorical) are related to children’s doctor visits for illness. For example, at the 
first wave, households with more assets are more likely to have children visit doctors 
for physical illness.  
6.5 Summary 
The results of fixed-effects analyses mostly agree with those reported in the 
last two chapters and partially support the hypothesis of asset effects for children (see 
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Table 6.1). Household net worth and liquid assets appear to reduce children’s 
probabilities of repeating a grade and being suspended from the school. Households 
are more likely to report children having excellent health if they have more net worth. 
In addition, with more net worth, children have fewer school days missed due to 
illness and experience hospitalization less frequently.  
One explanation for the disagreement between net worth and liquid assets is 
asset allocation. Different types of assets may affect child development in various 
ways. Another possible explanation is that some health outcome measures are related 
to health service utilization (i.e., hospitalization and doctor visits). Health service 
utilization, as expected, may be affected by household assets in different ways 
because household assets can provide financial resources for health services or help 
avoid negative health conditions, thereby reducing the need for health services.  
Findings regarding indicators of parenting behavior are quite expected. It is 
interesting that parents’ educational expectations are highly correlated with health 
outcomes. On one hand, parents’ educational expectations may reflect their general 
expectations for their children beyond education. On the other hand, this association 
could imply a reverse association between health outcomes and parents’ educational 
expectations. Finally, it is important to note that fixed-effects analyses on categorical 
outcome measures are conditional models, which have excluded all children lacking 
variation within the dependent variable. These results may not be generalizable for the 
entire population of interest. Finally, the SEM tests of the fourth strategy generate the 
results essentially consistent with those from the fixed-effects models. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion: Discussion and Implication 
This chapter summarizes the main findings on asset effects and other variables 
(e.g., parenting behavior variables, disability, and household income), and then 
discusses research and policy implications of these findings.  
7.1 Discussion 
7.1.1 The Hypothesis of Asset Effects 
The study examines asset effects for children with disabilities on nine child 
outcomes using four different strategies and four asset measures. The question is 
whether there is any conclusive evidence to support this hypothesis. Theoretical and 
policy implications would be clear and simple if there is perfect evidence – that is, 
household assets have expected, statistically significant, and homogenous marginal 
effects regardless of the differences in outcome measures, asset measures, and 
statistical strategies for model testing. The real results, however, seem much more 
complicated. There are several themes in the observations (see Table 7.1). First, 
several health outcome measures have statistical associations with household assets, 
and this finding is consistent in all four strategies. Second, the categorical measures of 
household assets seem to show asset effects better. Third, household assets may affect 
children’s health service utilization in various ways.  
TABLE 7.1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Asset Effects by Child Outcomes. All the child outcomes under examination 
have statistically significant associations with household assets in one or more tests. 
Consistent in the four testing strategies, children’s global health status, school days 
missed due to physical illness, and hospitalization are correlated with household 
assets.  
The findings provide insights into the pattern of asset effects. To use 
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children’s global health as an example, Table 7.2 summarizes Probit regression results 
on this outcome measure in the first, second, and fourth strategies. Fixed-effects 
analysis is not included because it uses conditional Logit model, and includes only 
children who have within-person variation on global health status. This table shows a 
decreasing trend regarding the magnitude of regression coefficients from assets 
measured before childbirth to current assets. For liquid assets, $1,000 is the threshold 
value for this type of assets to generate statistically significant and positive impact on 
children’s global health in the first strategy, but in the fourth strategy, the threshold 
value of liquid assets has to increase to $10,000 for the significant results to be 
detected. It indicates that household assets before childbirth or in early stages of 
childhood have greater influences on children’s global health than those at a later 
stage.  
TABLES 7.2 AND 7.3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Such tables can also be created for other health outcome measures, such as 
school days missed due to physical illness and hospitalization. Table 7.3 shows a 
different pattern of asset effects on school days missed. The number of school days 
missed decreases when household assets (measured before childbirth) increase, and 
the asset threshold to show this association is $10,000. In SEM analyses, when the 
asset measures in a later stage of childhood are used, the direction of the association 
between household assets and school days missed changes, perhaps because 
household assets before childbirth contribute to a lower probability of physical illness 
later on (preventive effects) and further reduce the number of school days missed. But 
asset measures in a later stage of childhood indicate household economic resources 
for providing services and support for children who are sick.  
Household assets also have significant associations with three outcome 
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measures—children’s experience of repeating a grade, school suspension or expulsion, 
and doctor visits for physical illness—in all strategies except for propensity score 
classification. A closer examination of the results, however, suggests that the 
associations of household assets with repeating a grade and school suspension or 
expulsion are relatively weak and unstable (see Tables 5.3 and 5.4). Only fixed-
effects analyses of children who had repeated a grade at least once show a strong 
association between household assets and repeating a grade. Doctor visits for illness, 
as an outcome measure, shows a pattern similar to school days missed due to illness in 
terms of its association with household assets, mostly because both measures are 
related to children’s physical illness.   
Children’s cognitive ability (or academic achievement), measured by two WJ-
R test scores, is positively related to household assets in the first strategy and the 
fourth strategy (SEM2 only). The insignificance of household assets in propensity 
score classification may suggest that children’s cognitive ability and household assets 
are both confounded with parental characteristics (such as education and parents’ 
cognitive ability). On the other hand, the insignificance of household assets in fixed-
effects analyses and SEM1 of the fourth strategy may indicate that children’s 
cognitive ability is relatively stable. There is not much within-person variation in 
these outcome measures after taking account of individual heterogeneity as indicated 
by the fixed term in fixed-effects analyses. 
 Children’s doctor visits for emotional problems show a positive association 
with household assets in the third and fourth strategies using assets measured in a later 
stage of childhood. This is similar to the findings on school days missed and doctor 
visits for illness in the same sets of analyses, implying a positive association between 
household assets and health service utilization. To sum up, these findings suggest 
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evidence for the hypothesis of asset effects on children’s health outcomes. Among the 
educational outcomes examined, children’s cognitive ability is less likely than school 
attainment to be affected by household assets.  
Asset Effects by Asset Types. While the PSID data provide household asset 
information on multiple asset types, it is not feasible to examine all of them in a single 
study. The current study focuses on household net worth and liquid assets. As 
discussed in the last section, findings on children’s health outcomes seem to be more 
consistent across different empirical strategies than educational outcomes, and, 
therefore, the findings on health outcomes are used to examine asset effects by asset 
types. In addition, both net worth and liquid assets have the same scale ($), which 
makes it possible to directly compare their results. There seems a pattern, especially 
in the first set of analyses, that the regression coefficients of liquid assets are greater 
than those of net worth. In other words, liquid assets have larger associations with 
children’s health outcomes than net worth. For example, the regression coefficient of 
the highest liquid asset category (above $10,000) on children’s global health is .69, 
but the coefficient of the net worth category of $10,001-$40,000 is only .33 (see Table 
7.2). To identify the varying effects by asset types adds to our understanding of the 
mechanism of asset effects.   
Nonlinear Distribution of Asset Effects. The distribution of asset effects on 
child outcomes is nonlinear. It is the categorical asset measures (as opposed to the 
continuous measures) for which statistically significant associations are more often 
found. The log-transformed net worth, for example, does not predict children’s global 
health in the first and fourth strategies, while the categorical one does. The nonlinear 
nature of asset effects is not surprising. However, several issues need to be addressed 
in order to estimate nonlinear asset effects.  
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First, can nonlinear asset effects be theorized? Chapter 5 illustrates different 
nonlinear asset effects (e.g., the U-shape and the N-shape), all of which are empirical 
estimation from the study sample. Some of these findings are puzzling and need to be 
examined further. The pure empirical investigation of nonlinear asset effects may be 
subject to mistakes caused by model misspecification, measurement errors, sampling 
variation, and arbitrary choices of asset categories. Therefore, theorization of 
nonlinear asset effects (if any) is needed in the future.  
Second, a direct implication of nonlinear asset effects is to help us identify a 
threshold for household assets to generate positive effects on child development. In 
the first strategy, children living in households with net worth greater than $10,000 
have better global health, and are less likely to miss school or visit doctors. But the 
net worth value has to increase to the level of $40,000 or more to significantly reduce 
the probability of hospitalization. The threshold for liquid assets to have positive 
effects is relatively low (see Table 5.7 for details). This is expected because 
households’ net worth value generally is higher than their liquid asset value. Based on 
the results presented in the last two chapters, it seems reasonable to tentatively 
propose some asset thresholds: that is, a net worth value of $40,000 and a liquid asset 
value of $10,000. This may provide a guideline for household saving behaviors. 
Third, given the nonlinear nature of asset effects, it seems that to take a 
logarithm of asset values, a conventional approach to highly skewed asset measures, 
may not be a good practice in testing asset effects. Specifically, there are two issues 
with regard to log-transformed continuous asset measures: (1) To estimate nonlinear 
asset effects using only one slope parameter is rather limited and can be misleading as 
well. For example, regarding children’s applied problems scores (see Figure 5.1), the 
slope of log-transformed net worth is almost zero because the estimation tends to 
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balance the two high ends of a U-shape asset effect. In contrast, the log-transformed 
net worth is statistically significant in the model of children’s school suspension due 
to an L-shape asset effect (see Figure 5.4). (2) Asset effects may be overestimated by 
using the log-transformed asset measures. In order to create log-transformed values, 
all negative asset values have to be clustered at the value of zero. This may create an 
artificially steep slope (see Figure 5.8, 5.10, and 5.12 for the Z-shape solid lines; all 
show a steep slope at the asset value zero). A simulated case in Figure 7.1 also 
illustrates the possibility of overestimation. Suppose the solid line shows a true slope 
of -.1 between net worth and the outcome measure in the net worth range of (-$30,000, 
$0). As displayed in the dash-dot line, when all negative net worth values are 
clustered at zero, the slope becomes 1.   
FIGURE 7.1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Finally, the estimated nonlinear effects may imply serious measurement errors 
in asset measures. It is suspected that households with negative net worth and those 
with zero liquid assets may have reporting errors in these two measures. For example, 
in the first set of analyses, these two groups show better educational outcomes than 
the other groups with higher net worth or liquid assets. One explanation is that 
households with negative net worth have access to the credit market and therefore 
may have more economic resources in the short term. Another possible explanation is 
that measurement errors (in asset measures) for these households may have interfered 
with the estimation of true asset effects.   
Size of Asset Effects. As discussed above, household assets have statistically 
positive effects for children with disabilities, especially on health outcomes. From a 
policy perspective, it is also important to ask whether these asset effects are 
practically meaningful. Chapters 5 and 6 have discussions of marginal asset effects 
 75
and the practical meaning of asset effects based on the first and third strategies. The 
following two examples suggest that household asset accumulation can contribute to 
child development. First, an increase in household net worth from $0 to $40,000 in 
early childhood can close the gap in math and reading scores between those who have 
finished high school and those who have not. Second, for a typical child, an increase 
of household net worth from $10,000 to $40,000 can raise the probability of having 
excellent health by 10%.  
Asset Effects for Sub-groups. The second strategy, propensity score 
classification, provides an opportunity to examine asset effects for multiple sub-
groups. With propensity score classification, households are categorized into three 
groups based on their expected asset values. Those with low-expected asset values 
may have actually accumulated assets higher than expected. Similarly, those with 
high-expected asset values may have saved only a small amount of assets. The 
difference between the expected and actual values allows the study to examine 
different asset effects for the low-expected and high-expected asset groups. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, asset effects for the group with low-expected asset values are 
greater than those for the group with high-expected values (see Table 5.10). From a 
policy perspective, this may imply that it is efficient for asset-based programs to 
target low-income and low-wealth households.  
Fixed-effects analyses for categorical outcome measures in the third strategy 
are conditional models, which only include children whose outcome measures show 
within-person variation. For example, children who did not repeat a grade in any 
wave are excluded from analyses. To some extent, this can be considered an analysis 
of sub-groups. Asset effects appear to be greater for children who are included in 
fixed-effects analyses. For instance, for liquid assets to have a positive impact on 
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educational outcomes indicated by repeating a grade, the threshold is as low as $1,000.   
Cumulative Asset Effects and Asset Effect Patterns. In Chapter 4, the study 
proposes the hypothesis of cumulative asset effects for model testing. That is, current 
child outcome is determined not only by current household assets but also by those at 
previous stages. This idea leads to three testable research questions.  
The first question is, “What is the pattern of asset effects by child’s age?” 
Possible patterns have been discussed in Chapter 4 (e.g., the increasing or decreasing 
pattern of asset effects by age). It is important to note that patterns of asset effects by 
age are different from the nonlinearity of asset effects discussed above. The former 
refers to asset effects associated with age or development stages of individual children. 
The latter is a general distribution of asset effects in the population. Although this 
study is not intended to test the pattern of asset effects by child’s age directly, the use 
of asset measures at different ages among these strategies and a comparison of the 
results, can, to some extent, provide insights into this question. For example, the 
discussion above suggests that household assets play a more important role in early 
childhood (i.e., a decreasing pattern) than later. 
The second question is to estimate average asset effects over childhood while 
ignoring the asset effect patterns. The first two strategies can be considered example 
analyses to test this question because they use asset measures at one time period to be 
a proxy of all household assets invested in child development in childhood.  
The third question is to examine the unique effects of household assets 
measured at a specific time point. For instance, researchers may be interested in asset 
effects when children reach age six conditional on previous cumulative asset effects. 
The third and fourth strategies may tackle this question since the individual fixed-term 
in fixed-effects analyses or the lagged outcome measures in SEM2 can be considered 
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an indicator of cumulative asset effects in previous stages.    
7.1.2 Mediation Mechanism and Parenting Behavior Variables 
The second aim of the study is to examine whether asset effects for children 
with disabilities are mediated through parenting behaviors. It is hypothesized that 
asset accumulation and asset holding affect parents’ engagement and investment in 
child development and further change child outcomes. To test this hypothesis, 
parenting behavior variables—including parental involvement, parental warmth, 
parenting stress, and parents’ educational expectations—are added in Models 3 and 5 
of the first strategy (see Table 5.3) and Longitudinal Model 3 (LM3) of the third 
strategy (see Table 6.3). If the mediation mechanism exists, then to include parenting 
behavior variables will reduce the correlation between household assets and outcome 
measures. In addition, these parenting behavior variables should have a direct 
association with child outcomes.    
This mediation hypothesis is not supported because the addition of parenting 
behavior variables in the model does not change the estimated asset effects in most of 
cases. Therefore, parenting behavior variables are not used in the second and fourth 
strategies. Models with parenting behavior variables actually suggest that, for 
households with the same level of parental involvement, the more assets households 
own, the better children develop. The question remains as to how household assets 
affect child well-being. In the future, there is a need to look into how household assets 
are associated with physical environment, such as home, school, and community.  
TABLE 7.4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 7.4 summarizes the relationships between parenting behavior variables 
and child outcomes. There are two main findings. One is that parental involvement 
and parents’ educational expectations promote child development and improve child 
 78
well-being. Parental involvement and parents’ educational expectations are positively 
related to children’s test scores and negatively related to children’s probability of 
repeating a grade and school suspensions. Second, parental warmth and parenting 
stress could be affected by child development. For instance, some health utilization 
variables (such as hospitalization and doctor visits for illness or emotional problems) 
are positively associated with parental warmth and parenting stress, possibly because 
children’s health conditions and service utilization change the level of parental 
warmth and parenting stress. Another explanation on the positive association between 
health services and parental warmth could be that parental warmth may increase 
parents’ sensitivity to children’s health and health service needs.  
7.1.3 Child Characteristics  
This section briefly discusses the results of child characteristics, with a focus 
on the first set of analyses. One of the child characteristics is child disability. 
Children’s disability status is a control variable in analyses. A measure indicating 
whether a child has a disability in a specific CDS wave is included in all analyses. In 
addition, disability types are also considered and added in the first and second 
strategies. 
Findings regarding children’s disability types are expected. Detailed results 
from the first strategy can be requested from the author of the dissertation. In 
summary, those with hearing difficulty or autism have lower WJ-R test scores;22 
children having visual difficulty or orthopedic impairment are less likely to repeat a 
grade; and those with learning disability or ADHD have a higher probability of school 
suspension. It is also found that children with autism have worse health (indicated by 
                                                 
22 I also conduct a robustness test excluding children with autism and emotional 
disturbance from the analyses of educational outcomes. Results of the robustness test 
are similar to those reported in Chapter 5.  
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global health status, hospitalization and doctor visits for illness). In addition, 
children’s emotional disturbance is associated with school days missed, doctor visits 
for illness, and doctor visits for emotional problems.   
The timing of disability also matters. As shown in Table 7.4, having a 
disability in either CDS Wave I or Wave II is always associated with poor child 
outcomes except for school suspension or expulsion. Having a disability is related to a 
lower probability of being suspended or expelled from the school. But the relationship 
between poor outcomes and having a disability in CDS Wave II is more likely to be 
statistically significant because child outcomes in the first set of analyses are 
measured at Wave II. In the fixed-effects analyses, the timing of disability variable 
actually indicates the change of disability status from the previous wave. Focusing on 
within-person comparison, therefore, the fixed-effects analyses show how the change 
of disability status (from non-disability to disability) affects child outcomes. Not 
surprisingly, the transition to disability is highly related to poor child outcomes. The 
transition to disability also substantially increases health service utilization.  
Another child characteristic is special education status. In the first set of 
analyses, children who are in special education programs at Wave II have poor 
outcomes on all dependent measures except for hospitalization and doctor visits for 
physical illness.  
In the first set of analyses, compared to female children, male children have 
higher applied problems scores, are more likely to be suspended from school, and 
have fewer doctor visits for physical illness. Black children have lower test scores and 
a higher probability of school suspension or expulsion than white children.  
The analyses also control for child’s age and age-squared. The regression 
coefficients of these two variables always have opposite directions. Child’s age is 
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positively related to the applied problems score, the likelihood of repeating a grade, 
number of school days missed, and doctor visits for emotional problems, but is 
negatively associated with the other child outcomes. The use of the categorical 
measure of child’s age in sensitivity tests produces similar results.  
7.1.4 Household Income 
Reported in Chapter 5, household income before childbirth is positively 
related to children’s applied problems scores alone. It does not correlate with any 
health outcome measures after controlling for child and household characteristics. In 
fixed-effects analyses, household income is not statistically significant for all outcome 
measures except children’s repeating a grade and doctor visits for emotional problems. 
Three general issues about household income in testing the hypothesis of asset effects 
are discussed below.  
First, the insignificance of household income, to some extent, increases our 
confidence in the estimated asset effects. As economic resources, both household 
income and assets may share similar confounders (i.e., employment, education, family 
background, and so on) when predicting child outcomes. If the estimated asset effects 
are biased due to the confoundedness, this problem may occur with household income 
as well. Given the distinct results on household income and assets, it seems the 
common confounders have been appropriately addressed.  
Second, it is important to consider how to control for other household 
economic resources (such as income) in analyses. Research on asset effects tries to 
identify the unique role of household assets different from household income. The 
conventional approach to add household income as a control variable, however, may 
not be able to distinguish asset effects additive to income effects (quantitative 
difference) and those effects unique to household assets (qualitative difference). In 
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fact, this strategy examines whether children from households with more assets have 
better child outcomes given the same level of household income. In other words, 
instead of testing the qualitative difference of household assets from income, this 
strategy actually tests whether more economic resources are associated with better 
child outcomes.  
The study does not intend to address this issue, but it can possibly be done by 
including two indicators of household economic resources in analysis: One is the total 
amount of household economic resources (that is, the sum of household assets and 
income), and the other is the ratio of household assets and household income. To 
control for the total amount of economic resources means that the analysis compares 
households with an equal amount of economic resources. Under this circumstance, if 
the ratio variable has a positive influence on child outcomes, it indicates that assets 
have effects different from household income (qualitative difference).  
Third, what income measure should be used? The current study and previous 
research use the mean of household income in several years as a proxy of household 
permanent income because it is less fluctuant than annual income. Household 
permanent income is a good measure of long-term economic resources. According to 
the classical theories of savings, such as the Life-Cycle Hypothesis and the buffer-
shock model (Nam et al., 2008), household assets are accumulated for consumption 
smoothing during income fluctuations, and extra income is saved when households 
have income more than needed for consumption. From this view, it is perhaps better 
to have a direct measure of income fluctuation.  
For example, suppose two households have the same level of permanent 
income. One experiences a short-term negative income shock and the other does not. 
The one with negative income shock maintains the same level of consumption by 
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spending down household savings. If household permanent income is controlled for, 
the effects of household assets on consumption smoothing are less likely to be 
detected because the analysis would compare the level of consumption for households 
with the same level of permanent income. A better approach is to create an income 
fluctuation indicator using both household permanent income and annual income.  
Finally, beyond the technical issues about household income discussed above, 
it is also important to clearly distinguish stocks (assets) and flows (income) 
conceptually. The theoretical relationship between assets and income is complicated 
and assets and income cannot be independent of each other by definitions. Assets are 
the difference between income and consumption, and asset stocks can generate 
income flows as well. This perspective suggests that it may not be sufficient to control 
for income in regression analysis.  
7.2 Limitations and Research Implications 
There are several limitations in this exploratory study of asset effects for 
children with disabilities. These limitations should be addressed in the future. First, 
the theory of asset effects for children has not been adequately specified. The 
empirical examination in the study is “reduced-form” tests and is exploratory in 
nature.  
As summarized in Chapter 2, possible effects of household assets on child 
development and child well-being are discussed in several studies (e.g., Lerman & 
McKernan, 2008; Nam & Huang, 2009; Shanks et al., 2009), which examine the 
direction (positive vs. negative) and mechanism of asset effects. It is believed that 
household assets affect child development through improving home environment, 
parenting behaviors, and family functioning. Some studies also discuss potential 
heterogeneity of asset effects across different populations. Valuable as they are, these 
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studies do not provide specific guidelines to examine asset effects. For example, it 
would be less meaningful to predict the direction of asset effects (i.e., positive or 
negative) if asset effects are in fact nonlinear. The findings on the mediation 
mechanism are mixed. Some studies (e.g., Kim, 2010), including this one, do not find 
strong empirical support for it.  
Built on previous theoretical discussions, the study defines asset effects from 
the life course perspective and considers asset effects cumulative during childhood. 
There are several key questions from this view: (1) What is the pattern of asset effects 
by child’s age or by stages of child development? The answer to this question helps 
determine the best timing when asset-based intervention is applied to facilitate child 
development. It also helps identify the average asset effects over childhood or asset 
effects at a specific stage. The current study has some preliminary evidence that 
household assets in early childhood are more important for children’s health outcomes 
than those in a later stage. (2) What is the distribution of asset effects in the 
population? This question helps theorize the nonlinear nature of asset effects. 
Practically, it is an effort to establish the asset threshold value at which household 
assets can generate positive impact on child development. (3) How to model 
heterogeneity of asset effects? Heterogeneity refers to varying asset effects by 
outcome measures, asset measures, and sub-populations. Two types of research—
descriptive (exploratory) or confirmative—can be conducted on these key questions. 
Exploratory investigation is used to summarize descriptive findings from the existing 
data and build specific and theoretical hypotheses. Then confirmative studies can be 
developed to test these hypotheses.    
Second, the study is focused on children with disabilities, and, as a key 
variable, disability indicated by disability types, and the transition from non-disability 
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to disability is closely examined. But interactions between disability characteristics 
and household assets are not closely looked at. Such interactions can be defined from 
two dimensions—asset effects for children with and without disabilities and for 
children with different types of disabilities. Children with different disability types 
have different development trajectories; multilevel analyses may be used in the 
research to address the heterogeneity of asset effects across disability types. This topic 
is left for future research.  
Third, asset effects for children with disabilities, if any, occur in a complex 
social and policy context. Asset effects for children with disabilities should be 
evaluated in a policy context. For example, the public education system may have a 
role in the association of household assets and child educational outcomes. 
Educational policy and school system may produce “noises” in the evaluation of asset 
effects for children with disabilities. For example, the No Child Left Behind policy 
may significantly change educational practices on special education in schools. 
School districts with fiscal pressures may tighten their special education eligibility.  
Different types of schools—typical public schools, Charter schools, and private 
schools—may reflect selection bias. In addition, children with disabilities may access 
more services if parents were able to communicate and negotiate with school.  
Health service delivery can also moderate asset effects on child health 
outcomes. For low-income households, public assistance, asset accumulation, and 
child development are all intertwined. For instance, low-income children receiving 
public health programs (e.g., Medicaid and State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program) may have better health or health services than those with income slightly 
higher than the poverty line and not eligible for public programs. The means-tested 
eligibility of these programs is likely to change parents’ saving behavior. High levels 
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of public services may reduce the need for private financial resources. For instance, 
states have different asset limit eligibility rules for State Children Health Insurance 
Program; it is important to examine different asset effects on health outcomes among 
states with various asset limits. Future research should examine the social and policy 
context of asset effects for children with disabilities. 
Fourth, household asset measures likely have measurement errors, although 
the PSID provides high quality data. There are some puzzling results in the study, 
especially on those with negative net worth or zero liquid assets. These results may be 
related to the measurement errors of household assets. This limitation is not 
uncommon in self-reported survey data. Future research can address it by collecting 
accurate data or modeling measurement errors. For example, household asset 
information collected by the IRS or banking institutions is reliable and may be 
considered for this type of study. Another thought is to build a theoretical model of 
measurement errors (measurement model) and apply appropriate statistical analyses 
(such as confirmatory factor analysis or item response model) for model testing.   
Fifth, the hypothesis of asset effects assumes causality between household 
assets and child development. Even when all limitations above are addressed, it is still 
difficult, if not impossible, to test causality using observational data because child 
development is a complex process affected by multiple systems and their interactions 
(such as disability, school, and health policy discussed above). The reduced-form 
analyses used in the dissertation are likely to have bias due to not considering these 
dynamics. It raises a concern regarding the extent to which the analyses accurately 
estimate asset effects on child outcomes. On one hand, programs with experimental 
design will be especially useful in this regard. On the other hand, it is important to use 
a structural approach for clear specification of these dynamics in the conceptual 
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model (Pearl, 2000). If the study claims that asset effects vary by disability types or 
policy contexts, these hypotheses should be included in the conceptual model 
appropriately.  
Finally, there is still ample room for technical improvement. For instance, it 
may be better to model children’s experiences of repeating a grade and school 
suspension or expulsion using event-history analysis. Other methods or estimators 
(i.e., Generalized Method of Moments) can also be considered upon the availability of 
panel data with more than three waves.  
7.3 Policy Implications 
The study finds that household assets have positive effects for children with 
disabilities, especially on health outcomes. In this sample, asset effects generally 
emerge when household net worth is greater than $40,000 or liquid assets are greater 
than $10,000. Although the findings suggest that household assets in early childhood 
are more important for child well-being than those at a later stage, the positive 
association between household assets and child outcomes exists in both periods, with 
the mechanism of assets varying at different stages. This indicates the importance of 
having assets throughout childhood. The study also shows that marginal asset effects 
are greater in low-income and low-wealth households. These findings not only have 
implications for asset-based policies for children with disabilities and their families, 
but also provide an empirical justification for the policy proposals mentioned in 
Chapter 1. For example, since household assets have effects throughout childhood, 
Child Development Accounts (CDAs), which encourage households to save for their 
children from childbirth, appear a good asset-building policy option for all children, 
including those with disabilities. Other policy options mentioned at the beginning of 
the dissertation, such as Disability Savings Accounts or Individual Development 
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Accounts (IDAs) for youth with disabilities, are also useful for specific saving 
purposes or populations (e.g., children receiving Supplemental Security Income). This 
study further argues that asset building should be considered a policy strategy for the 
successful development of children with disabilities. 
Current US disability policies and programs are faced with the challenges of 
financial sustainability and high poverty and unemployment rates among people with 
disabilities. Disability policy is under radical modification to have a greater focus on 
health and human capital, successful transition to adulthood, and economic 
independence for children with disabilities. The findings of the study suggest that 
asset building should be a necessary component in this new vision. Although 
household assets have been included in the new picture of policy development (see 
the policy proposals in Chapter 1), their role has not been clearly defined yet. From 
my view, asset building, education and training, health services, and social 
engagement and inclusion are the four most important strategies to achieve this new 
vision for children with disabilities, and these strategies should be adopted throughout 
the entire disability policy system. For this population, economic resources, including 
household assets, are the foundation for successful child development and 
accumulation of health and human capital, as well as a key determinant of future 
economic independence. Asset building can even be a facilitator of the other three 
strategies mentioned above. More research in this area is needed to help clarify the 
role of household assets in this new vision.  
The first step to achieve this new vision of asset building for children with 
disabilities is to summarize existing knowledge and lessons. The current study 
provides a brief review of the work in this area (see Chapter 2). Admittedly, such 
research is especially rare when it comes to children with disabilities. A systematic 
 88
review of existing knowledge and lessons is imperative, especially in the following 
aspects: (1) theories of disability and development and how to relate them to asset 
building; (2) the well-being of children with disabilities as indicated by poverty, 
assets, and educational and health outcomes; (3) an assessment of current disability 
programs and services for children and their relevance to asset building; and (4) a 
review of existing asset building strategies for the general population.  
Summarized knowledge and lessons should be applied to test asset building 
for children with disabilities in practice. Policy innovations can include but are not 
limited to the following ideas: (1) developing new operations in existing programs to 
accommodate asset building goals; and (2) creating new programs to encourage asset 
accumulation. Examples of new operations in existing programs are Individual 
Development Accounts (IDAs) for children with disabilities in the SSI program, the 
inclusion of financial education and financial services in the Individualized Education 
Plan for children with disabilities, and more generous tax benefits for flexible 
spending accounts for disabled children. An example of new programs is Child 
Savings Accounts (CSAs) discussed in Chapter 1.  
Several findings of the study are useful for designing asset-based policy 
innovations for children with disabilities. First, asset-based programs should start 
early and last long. The study suggests that household assets before childbirth have a 
positive impact on children’s health outcomes by preventing the occurrence of 
negative health conditions. It may be appropriate to use asset-based programs to foster 
parents’ savings for all children even at the prenatal stage. The program should be 
universal and inclusive since the risk of having a disability always exists. The 
purposes of asset accumulation may be adjusted later if children are diagnosed with a 
disability. The study also finds positive associations between children’s health 
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outcomes and household assets in later childhood. This lends support for asset-based 
programs that encourage a continuous process of asset accumulation lasting 
throughout and even beyond childhood. 
Second, asset-based programs should mainly target health outcomes for 
children with disabilities because they have a high level of unmet health needs. The 
findings of asset effects on health outcomes for children with disabilities are 
consistent across four different empirical strategies. Current asset-based programs for 
children, such as Educational Savings Accounts and 529 Plans, generally focus on 
education. Ideally, asset-based programs for children should have an array of savings’ 
purposes broader than education and match the child’s developmental goals. In this 
regard, Child Savings Accounts (CSAs) seem a better design. For children with 
disabilities, saving for health should be emphasized in particular.  
Third, household assets affect individual well-being through both asset 
spending (consumption) and asset holding. These two may seem conflicting because 
holding assets may limit the use of assets. The different findings of asset effects on 
health service utilization (e.g., doctor visits for physical illness) between the first and 
fourth set of analyses are a reflection of these two mechanisms. Therefore, asset-based 
programs should create a structure that allows program participants to benefit from 
both types of asset effects. For example, such programs may set up a minimum 
savings amount for long-term goals and any savings beyond this amount can be spent 
for restricted purposes, such as health and education.  
Fourth, the minimum savings amount of asset-based programs for children 
with disabilities should be set at around $10,000, and these programs should help 
families achieve this goal as early as possible. As indicated by this study, asset effects 
are more likely to seen when households have liquid assets greater than $10,000. 
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Apparently, this goal can be challenging for some families because the median value 
of household liquid assets in the sample is $2,000. The minimum savings goal could 
be lower because perhaps liquid assets examined in this study are not entirely 
intended for children with disabilities. Further research is needed to see how much 
savings families truly spend on children with disabilities. An alternative is that the 
government provide a large amount of seed funds (e.g., $5,000), or families can 
“borrow” without interest for savings in asset-based programs from the government or 
the market. 
Finally, asset-based programs should be progressive toward low-income and 
low-wealth populations. The study finds that household assets have greater marginal 
effects for low-income and low-wealth households than for high-income and high-
wealth households. Disadvantaged populations benefit more from asset ownership. 
Progressive asset-based programs are both efficient and equitable. To achieve 
progressiveness, appropriate financial incentives can be provided for disadvantaged 
populations. Asset-based programs may provide a higher match savings rate, larger 
match savings amount, or more seed funds for low-income participants than for 
typical program participants. To achieve equity, The distribution of government 
expenditures should be reconsidered and redirected given that the current asset-based 
policies are administered largely through the tax code and lean toward the wealthy, 
while low-income households benefit little from these policies because these 
households have a low marginal tax rate, do not itemize deductions, or do not accrue 
much tax liability. In addition, new asset-based programs should expand access to 
financial services and improve the financial capability of disadvantaged populations.   
7.4 Conclusion 
The study tests the hypothesis of asset effects on educational and health 
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outcomes for children with disabilities using the PSID-CDS longitudinal data. 
Household assets are found to have consistent and positive effects on major health 
outcome measures in all empirical strategies, and, in some analyses, positive effects 
on children’s educational achievement. Asset effects generally emerge when 
household net worth is greater than $40,000 or liquid assets are greater than $10,000. 
Although household assets in early childhood are more important for child well-being 
than those at a later stage, positive associations between household assets and child 
outcomes exist in both periods. This indicates the importance of having assets 
throughout childhood. The study also shows greater marginal asset effects for low-
income and low-wealth households. While confirming the importance of household 
assets in child development for children with disabilities, the hypothesized mediation 
mechanism, which argues household assets affect child well-being through changing 
parent behaviors, is not supported.  
The findings of this study have important policy implications and are 
particularly useful for designing and testing asset-based policy innovations for 
children with disabilities. It suggests that asset building should be included in the new 
vision for successful development of children with disabilities. Asset accumulation 
for children with disabilities should start early and last long with a specific focus on 
health and health services. The minimum savings goal should be set at around 
$10,000. Asset-based programs for children with disabilities should be progressive 
toward those with low income and low wealth. 
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Tables 
 
Table 2.1 Effects of Asset Spending and Asset Holding for Children with Disabilities 
 
Asset Effects Through Areas of Family 
Function Asset Spending Asset Holding 
Economic Security 
Consumption smoothing in 
economic crises 
 
Help families better plan 
for the future and avoid 
economic hardship 
 
Access to Services and 
Support 
Provide economic resources 
for services of desired 
quantity and quality 
Availability of high-
quality services and 
support through 
homeownership  
 
Investment in Child 
Development 
Positive physical 
environment to stimulate 
cognitive development and 
provide opportunities for 
high-quality education 
School and neighborhood 
environments indicated 
by homeownership 
 
Increase expectations for 
children as well as 
willingness to invest in 
child investment 
 
Psychological Well-being 
Help create a sense of 
control and greater life 
satisfaction  
 
Help develop future 
orientation, self-esteem, 
self-efficacy, and 
positive self-image 
 
 
Table 3.1 Waves of the PSID and PSID-CDS Major Variables 
Year 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 99 01 02 03 05 07 
Child disability in the CDS files 
              ×   ×   × 
Asset variables in the PSID family files 
 ×     ×     ×    × ×  × × × 
Outcome variables (health and education) in the CDS files 
              ×   ×   × 
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Table 3.2 Variables and Measures Used in the Study23 
Variables Measurement Range 
Disability Variables  
    Ten health condition indicators Dichotomous 0-1 
Dependent Variables  
    WJ-R broad reading score Continuous 0-200 
    WJ-R applied problems test Continuous 0-200 
    Grade repeated (Yes/No) Dichotomous 1 or 0 
    School suspension/expulsion  (Yes/No) Dichotomous 1 or 0 
    Global health status (Excellent/Otherwise) Dichotomous 1 or 0 
    School days missed due to physical illness Count 0 - +∞ 
    Number of hospitalizations Count 0 - +∞ 
    Number of doctor visits for illness Count 0 - +∞ 
    Doctor visits for emotional problems  (Yes/No) Dichotomous 1 or 0 
Independent Variables: Asset Variables 
    Amount of net worth Continuous -∞ - +∞ 
    Four-level net worth Ordinal 1, 2, 3, and 4 
    Amount of liquid assets Continuous 0 - +∞ 
    Four-level liquid assets Ordinal  1, 2, 3, and 4 
Control Variables 1: Child Characteristics  
    Age  Continuous 0-13 
    Gender (Male) Dichotomous 1 or 0 
    Race (Black and White) Dichotomous 1 or 0 
    Special education status (Yes/No) Dichotomous 1 or 0 
    Health insurance coverage Nominal 1,2, and 3 
    Disability types (10 indicators) (Yes/No) Dichotomous 1-0 
Control Variables 2: Parents’ Characteristics  
     Household header’s gender (Male) Dichotomous 1 or 0 
     Household header’s employment (Employed) Dichotomous 1 or 0 
     Mother’s age Continuous 0-+∞ 
     Mother’s education  Ordinal  1, 2, 3, and 4 
     Mother’s marital status (Married) Dichotomous 1 or 0 
Control Variables 3: Household Characteristics  
                                                 
23 The data sources listed in this table are particularly for childhood sample 1. For 
childhood sample 2, data sources are slightly different. For example, disability 
indicators and child outcome measures are from all three waves of the CDS. Asset 
measures are from family files in 1994, 1999, and 2003.  
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Variables Measurement Range 
     Household size Continuous 1-+∞ 
     Number of children Continuous 1-+∞ 
     Household income Continuous -∞ - +∞ 
     Public program participation (Yes/No)  Dichotomous 1 or 0 
     Region  Nominal  1, 2, 3, and 4 
Control Variables 4: Parenting Behaviors  (Measured in the CDS) 
    Parental involvement Continuous 7-27 
    Educational Expectations Ordinal 1, 2, and 3 
    Parental warmth scale Continuous 1-5 
    Parenting stress Continuous 1-5 
 
Table 4.1 Timing of Measures in Fixed-Effects Models 
 Observation 1 
(t=1) 
Observation 2 
(t=2) 
Observation 3 
(t=3) 
Child outcome measures 1997 (CDS I) 2002 (CDS II) 2007 (CDS III) 
Child characteristics 1997 (CDS I) 2002 (CDS II) 2007 (CDS III) 
Parenting behaviors  1997 (CDS I) 2002 (CDS II) 2007 (CDS III) 
Asset measures  1994 1999 2003 
Household characteristics  1994 1999 2003 
Household head’s characteristics  1994 1999 2003 
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Table 5.1 Result Comparison of the First and Second Sets of Analyses a 
 
Educational Outcomes Health Outcomes 
Asset Variables 
Applied 
Problems 
Score 
Broad 
Reading 
Score 
Repeated 
Grade 
School 
Suspension/ 
Expulsion 
Global 
Health 
School 
Days 
Missed 
Hospitalization Doctor 
Visits for 
Illness 
Doctor 
Visits for 
Emotional 
Problems 
Panel I. The First Set of Analyses  
Net Worth          
    Continuous    -  - - -  
    Categorical +  +   -  + - - -  
Liquid Assets          
    Continuous     + - - -  
    Categorical -  - - - + - - -  
Panel II. The Second Set of Analyses  
Net Worth          
    Continuous          
    Categorical     + - -   
Liquid Assets          
    Continuous     + - -   
    Categorical     + - -   
a. Only significant results are marked in the table: “+” and “-” are used to indicate positive and negative associations, respectively. 
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Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics (weighted, N=732 in each imputed dataset) 
Variables Mean or % SD Median 
Dependent Variables (in 2002)    
Applied problems score 102.15 17.82 101.01 
Broad reading score 102.29 19.71 100.64 
Repeated grade (yes) 17%   
School suspension or expulsion (yes) 17%   
Global health (excellent) 50%   
Number of school days missed  3.37 4.55 2 
Number of hospitalization  .28 1.12 0 
Number of doctor visit for illness  2.42 4.20 1 
Doctor visit for emotional problem (yes) 39%   
Asset Measures    
Net worth $64,110 $201,183 $12,400 
    Percentage of negative net worth 18%   
    Percentage of zero net worth 5%   
    Log-transformed net worth  7.69 4.50 9.42 
    Categorical measure of net worth (%)    
        <$0 18%   
        $0-$10,000 28%   
        $10,001-$40,000 24%   
        >$40,000 30%   
Liquid assets $21,243 $97,813 $1,600 
    Log-transformed liquid assets 6.43 3.90 7.38 
    Categorical measure of liquid assets (%)    
        =$0 21%   
        $1-$1,000 25%   
        $1,001-$10,000 27%   
        >$10,000 27%   
Assets measured in:    
1984  35%   
1989 43%   
1994 22%   
Control Variables a    
Child’s characteristics (measured in 1997)    
Age in 2002 11.69 3.40 12 
Gender (male) 60%  Male 
Race (Black) 18%  White 
Birth order to mother  1.97 .95 2 
Special education (yes) 28%  No 
Medical insurance in 2001   1 
   No insurance 6%   
   Employer-provided or private insurance 71%   
   Government-provided insurance 24%   
Disability in 1997 57%   
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Variables Mean or % SD Median 
Disability in 2002 78%   
Disability Types   Learning disability 
   Epileptic convulsion 5%   
   Speech impairment 15%   
   Hearing difficulty 7%   
   Seeing difficulty or blindness 11%   
   Emotional disturbance  4%   
   Orthopedic impairment 13%   
   Learning disability 16%   
   Autism 2%   
   ADD/ADHD 29%   
Household background    
Head’s gender (male) 81%  Male 
Head’s employment (employed) 78%  Employed 
Household size 3.40 1.51 3 
Number of children 1.31 1.22 1 
Food stamps (yes) 21%  No 
AFDC (yes) 37%  No 
SSI (yes) 31%  No 
Average income in previous five years $29,139 $25,686 $23,734 
   Log-transformed income 9.91 .93 10.07 
Mother’s marital status in 2001 (married) 67%  Married 
Mother’s age in 2001 33.24 6.84 34 
Mother’s education in 2001   Some College 
   Less than high school 10%   
   High school 35%   
   Some college 31%   
   Four-year college and above 24%   
Mother’s reading score in 1997 30.98 5.32 32 
Region in 1999   3 
   Northeast 19%   
   North central 26%   
   South  39%   
   West 17%   
Mediators (measured in 1997)    
Parental involvement 19.97 3.52 20.7 
Parental warmth 4.53 .53 4.67 
Parenting stress 2.15 .71 2.11 
Educational expectations (%)   Four-year college 
  High school and below 23%   
  Some college  13%   
  Four-year college and above 64%   
a Unless specified in table, control variables are measured at the time when asset information is collected.  
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Table 5.3 Net Worth and Educational Outcomes: Results of the First Strategy 
 
Variables Model 1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
 Panel A: Applied Problems Scores (OLS) Panel B: Broad Reading Scores (OLS) 
Family Economic Resources           
  Log-transformed income 3.75** 3.83** 3.31** 3.44** 2.95* 1.80 1.80 1.24 1.25 .69 
  Log-transformed net worth  -.03  -.05   -.0003  -.03  
  Categorical measure of net worth 
  (Reference group: $0-$10,000)           
      <$0   3.11  3.30   2.54  3.02 
      $10,001-$40,000   .03  -.56   1.42  1.25 
      >$40,000   5.40*  5.17*   5.17**  5.06** 
Parenting Behaviors           
  Parental involvement    .72** .73**    .65** .65** 
  Parenting warmth    -1.85 -1.95    -3.86** -4.04** 
  Parenting stress    1.29 1.49    -.87 -.79 
  Educational expectations  
  (Reference group: High school or   
   below) 
          
      Some college    .03 .48    1.02 1.53 
      Four-year college and above    5.38*** 
5.59**
*    
7.34**
* 7.49*** 
Regression coefficients are reported in the table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1. 
 
 
 
 107
Variables Model 1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
 Panel C: Repeated Grade (Probit) Panel D: School Suspension or Expulsion (Probit) 
Family Economic Resources -.14 -.15 -.12 -.12 -.09 .19 .28 .24 .28* .24 
  Log-transformed income           
  Log-transformed net worth  .002  .003   -.03**  -.03**  
  Categorical measure of net worth 
  (Ref. group: $0-$10,000)           
      <$0   -.25  -.28   .48**  .49** 
      $10,001-$40,000   .02  .03   .10  .15 
      >$40,000   -.46  -.47   -.05  .03 
Parenting Behaviors           
  Parental involvement    -.03 -.03    -.10** -.10** 
  Parenting warmth    .04 .06    -.15 -.17 
  Parenting stress    .19 .18    .18 .18 
  Educational expectations  
  (Ref. group: High school or    
   below) 
          
      Some college    .02 .0009    -.27 -.26 
      Four-year college and above    -.27 -.31    .14 .14 
      Regression coefficients are reported in the table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1. 
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Table 5.4 Liquid Assets and Educational Outcomes: Results of the First Strategy 
 
Variables Model 1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model  
4 
Model  
5 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model  
4 
Model 
 5 
 Panel A: Applied Problems Scores (OLS) Panel B: Broad Reading Scores (OLS) 
Family Economic Resources           
  Log-transformed income 3.75** 4.27** 4.01** 3.84** 3.64** 1.80 2.32 1.85 1.63 1.27 
  Homeownership (yes)  2.40 2.19 1.95 1.78  1.80 1.62 1.58 1.25 
  Log-transformed liquid assets  -.38  -.37   -.35  -.31  
  Categorical measure of liquid 
assets 
  (Ref. group: =0) 
          
     $1-$1,000   -5.94**  -5.53**   -7.48**  -6.65** 
     $1,001-$10,000   -6.15  -6.37   -5.56  -5.72 
     >$10,000   -4.03  -3.84   -3.40  -2.98 
Parenting Behaviors           
  Parental involvement    .68** .66**    .61* .83** 
  Parenting warmth    -1.68 -1.78    -3.72** -3.97** 
  Parenting stress    1.24 1.41    -.90 -.03 
  Educational expectations  
  (Ref. group: High school or    
   below) 
          
      Some college    .15 .33    1.14 3.00 
      Four-year college and above    5.50*** 5.59***    7.43*** 9.19*** 
Regression coefficients are reported in the table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1. 
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Variables Model 1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model  
4 
Model  
5 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model  
4 
Model 
 5 
 Panel C: Repeated Grade (Probit) Panel D: School Suspension or Expulsion (Probit) 
Family Economic Resources           
  Log-transformed income -.14 -.16 -.09 -.12 -.06 .19 .17 .20 .16 .19 
  Homeownership  -.005 .04 -.005 .04  -.26 -.23 -.24 -.21 
  Log-transformed liquid assets  .007  .005   .03  .03  
  Categorical measure of liquid 
assets 
  (Ref. group: =$0) 
          
      $1-$1,000   .55**  .53**   .48*  .42* 
      $1,001-$10,000   .05  .06   .04  .06 
      >$10,000   -.16  -.20   .39  .42 
Parenting Behaviors           
  Parental involvement    -.03 -.02    -.10** -.09* 
  Parenting warmth    .04 .02    -.14 -.15 
  Parenting stress    .20 .17    .19 .18 
  Educational expectations  
  (Ref. group: High school or 
below) 
          
      Some college    .03 .08    -.34 -.32 
      Four-year college and above    -.27 -.28    .10 .12 
Regression coefficients are reported in the table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1. 
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Table 5.5 Test Score Means by Educational Attainment 
Educational Attainment in 2007 
Test Score in 2002 Below 
high school 
High school 
and above 
College 
enrollment 
Applied problems 
score  
97.2 102.2 106.8 
Broad reading 
score 
97.1 102.7 108.0 
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Table 5.6 Net Worth and Health Outcomes: Results of the First Strategy 
 
Variables Model 1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model  
5 
 Panel A: Global Health (Probit) Panel B: School Days Missed (Negative Binomial) 
Family Economic Resources           
  Log-transformed income .19 .17 .13 .17 .12 -.09 -.06 .02 -.04 .02 
  Log-transformed net worth  .007  .007   -.02**  -.02**  
  Categorical measure of net worth 
  (Reference group: $0-$10,000)           
      <$0   .08  .09   .02  .004 
      $10,001-$40,000   .33*  .33*   -.35**  -.36** 
      >$40,000   .41**  .39**   -.56***  -.55*** 
Parenting Behaviors           
  Parental involvement    .02 .02    -.02 -.02 
  Parenting warmth    .02 .0002    .09 .12 
  Parenting stress    -.17 -.17    .13 .12 
  Educational expectations  
  (Reference group: High school or   
   below) 
          
      Some college    .002 .05    -.04 -.10 
      Four-year college and above    .06 .07    -.09 -.09 
Regression coefficients are reported in the table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1. 
 
 
 
 112
Variables Model 1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model  
5 
 Panel C: Hospitalization (Negative Binomial) Panel D: Doctor Visits for Illness (Negative Binomial) 
Family Economic Resources           
  Log-transformed income -.24 -.15 -.09 -.25 -.18 -.02 -.02 .04 -.03 .02 
  Log-transformed net worth  -.04**  -.03*   -.02**  -.02**  
  Categorical measure of net worth 
  (Ref. group: $0-$10,000)           
      <$0   .24  .09   .10  .05 
      $10,001-$40,000   -.43  -.47   -.28*  -.28* 
      >$40,000   -.79*  -.75*   -.51***  -.51*** 
Parenting Behaviors           
  Parental involvement    -.06 -.06    -.04* -.04 
  Parenting warmth    .65** .67**    .03 .05 
  Parenting stress    .57* .56*    .05 .04 
  Educational expectations  
  (Ref. group: High school or    
   below) 
          
      Some college    .21 .18    -.07 -.13 
      Four-year college and above    .46 .44    .27 .25 
Regression coefficients are reported in the table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1. 
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Variables Model 1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model  
5 
 Panel E: Doctor Visits for Emotional Problems  (Probit)  
Family Economic Resources           
  Log-transformed income .04 .05 .02 .07 .06      
  Log-transformed net worth  -.001  -.0006       
  Categorical measure of net worth 
  (Ref. group: $0-$10,000)           
      <$0   .21  .22      
      $10,001-$40,000   .03  .03      
      >$40,000   .18  .21      
Parenting Behaviors           
  Parental involvement    .005 .005      
  Parenting warmth    -.04 -.07      
  Parenting stress    .25 .25      
  Educational expectations  
  (Ref. group: High school or    
   below) 
          
      Some college    -.07 -.04      
      Four-year college and above    -.18 -.17      
Regression coefficients are reported in the table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1. 
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Table 5.7 Liquid Assets and Health Outcomes: Results of the First Strategy 
 
Variables Model 1 
Model 
2 
Model  
3 
Model 
4 
Model  
5 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
 Panel A: Global Health (Probit) Panel B: School Days Missed (Negative Binomial) 
Family Economic Resources           
  Log-transformed income .19 .05 .09 .04 .07 -.09 .06 .06 .08 .06 
  Homeownership  .02 .08 .03   -.30** -.29** -.30** -.30** 
  Log-transformed liquid assets  .06***  .06***   -.05**  -.05**  
  Categorical measure of liquid assets 
  (Reference group: $0)           
      $1-$1,000   .63***  .69***   -.02  -.06 
      $1,001-$10,000   .39*  .40*   -.25  -.25 
      >$10,000   .69***  .70***   -.42**  -.43* 
Parenting Behaviors           
  Parental involvement    .02 .02    -.02 -.01 
  Parenting warmth    .003 -.01    .10 .09 
  Parenting stress    -.18 -.21    .15 .14 
  Educational expectations 
  (Reference group: High school or    
   below) 
          
      Some college    -.007 -.009    -.05 -.05 
      Four-year college and above    .06 .06    -.06 -.06 
Regression coefficients are reported in the table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1. 
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Variables Model 1 
Model 
2 
Model  
3 
Model 
4 
Model  
5 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
 Panel C: Hospitalization (Negative Binomial) Panel D: Doctor Visits for Illness (Negative Binomial) 
Family Economic Resources           
  Log-transformed income -.24 -.28 .24 -.18 .11 -.02 .14 .11 .13 .09 
  Homeownership  .09 .07 .16 .15  -.31** -.32** -.29** -.32** 
  Log-transformed liquid assets  -.19***  -.19***   -.06***  -.06***  
  Categorical measure of liquid assets 
  (Reference group: $0)           
      $1-$1,000   -.83**  -.76**   -.15  -.20* 
      $1,001-$10,000   -2.38***  -2.30***   -.37*  -.38* 
      >$10,000   -1.80***  -1.68***   -.44**  -.47** 
Parenting Behaviors           
  Parental involvement    -.04 -.03    -.04 -.04 
  Parenting warmth    .68** .66**    .07 .04 
  Parenting stress    .62** .60**    .08 .07 
  Educational expectations  
  (Ref. group: High school or    
   below) 
          
      Some college    .21 .34    -.08 -.08 
      Four-year college and above    .44 .54    .28 .27 
Regression coefficients are reported in the table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1. 
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Variables Model 1 
Model 
2 
Model  
3 
Model 
4 
Model  
5 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
 Panel E: Doctor Visits for Emotional Problems  (Probit)  
Family Economic Resources           
  Log-transformed income .05 -.02 -.06 .005 -.03      
  Homeownership  -.009 -.04 -.03 -.07      
  Log-transformed liquid assets  .03  .03       
  Categorical measure of liquid assets 
  (Reference group: $0)           
      $1-$10,000   -.13  -.17      
      $10,001-$40,000   .16  .15      
      >$40,000   .42  .40      
Parenting Behaviors           
  Parental involvement    .005 .001      
  Parenting warmth    -.06 -.05      
  Parenting stress    .24** .26**      
  Educational expectations  
  (Ref. group: High school or below           
      Some college    -.08 -.08      
      Four-year college and above    -.19 -.18      
Regression coefficients are reported in the table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1. 
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Table 5.8 Average Asset Effects on Educational Outcomes 
After Propensity Score Classification 
 
Educational Outcomes 
Applied 
Problems 
Score 
Broad 
Reading 
Score 
Repeated 
Grade 
School 
Suspension/ 
Expulsion 
Asset Variables 
M 2 M 3 M 2 M 3 M 2 M 3 M 2 M 3 
Panel I: Net Worth         
  Log-transformed  .02  .10  -.03  -.01  
  Categorical 
  (ref: $0-$10,000) 
        
      <$0  2.73  -2.15  .17  .86 
      $10,001-$40,000  1.35  -.26  -.06  .54 
      Above $40,000  1.86  .43  -.17  .25 
Panel II: Liquid 
Assets 
        
  Log-transformed  -.25  -.004  -.04  .01  
  Categorical (ref: $0)         
      $1-$10,000  -4.61  -2.11  .45  .48 
      $10,001-$40,000  -4.17  -1.57  -.46  .40 
      Above $40,000  -3.54  -.68  -.32  -.11 
***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1 
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Table 5.9 Average Asset Effects on Health Outcomes After Propensity Score Classification 
 
Health Outcomes 
Global Health School Days 
Missed 
Hospitalization Doctor Visits 
for Illness 
Doctor Visits for 
Emotional Problems Asset Variables 
M 2 M 3 M 2 M 3 M 2 M 3 M 2 M 3 M 2 M 3 
Panel I: Net Worth           
  Log-transformed  .007  -.02  -.02  -.02  -.005  
  Categorical 
  (ref: $0-$10,000) 
          
      <$0  .11  -.23  .06  .08  .08 
      $10,001-$40,000  .36  -.40  -.29  -.21  -.36 
      Above $40,000  .57*  -.99***  -.97***  -.33  .50 
Panel II: Liquid Assets           
  Log-transformed  .08***  -.07***  -.13***  -.03  .03  
  Categorical (ref: $0)           
      $1-$10,000  .90***  -.17  -.59  .26  -.55 
      $10,001-$40,000  .64***  -.57**  -1.49***  -.11  -.36 
      Above $40,000  1.18***  -.65*  -1.24***  -.22  .32 
***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1 
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Table 5.10 Average Asset Effects for Sub-groups by Expected Assets 
 
Health Outcomes 
Global Health School Days 
Missed 
Hospitalization 
Asset Variables 
M 2 M 3 M 2 M 3 M 2 M 3 
 PANEL I: High Expected Assets Group 
Liquid Assets       
  Log-transformed  .07  -.10  -.03  
  Categorical (ref: $0)       
      Above $10,000  .69  -.60  -.31 
 PANEL II: Low Expected Assets Group 
Liquid Assets       
  Log-transformed  .12***  -.08  -.15***  
  Categorical (ref: $0)       
      Above $10,000  2.31***  -1.19  -1.77 
M2=Model 2 with the continuous liquid asset measure; M3=Model 3 with the 
categorical liquid asset measure. For categorical liquid asset measure, only the 
regression coefficients for the highest liquid asset group (>$40,000) are reported. 
***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1  
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Table 6.1 Results Comparison of Fixed-Effects Models and SEM Analyses a 
 
Educational Outcomes Health Outcomes 
Asset Variables 
Applied 
Problems 
Score 
Broad 
Reading 
Score 
Repeated 
Grade 
School 
Suspension/ 
Expulsion 
Global 
Health
School 
Days 
Missed
Hospitalization Doctor 
Visits for 
Illness 
Doctor 
Visits for 
Emotional 
Problems 
Panel I. The Third Set of Analyses: Fixed-Effects Analyses  
Net Worth          
    Continuous   -  + - -  + 
    Categorical   - - + + + + + 
Liquid Assets          
    Continuous   -  + +    
    Categorical   - - + +  +/- - 
Panel II. The Fourth Set of Analyses: SEM Models  
Net Worth          
    Continuous +   -   -  + 
    Categorical +  +  -  + +   + 
Liquid Assets          
    Continuous +  +    + + - +  
    Categorical +  +   - +  - + + 
a. Only significant results are marked in the table: “+” and “-” are used to indicate positive and negative associations. 
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Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics of Three-Wave PSID-CDS Data 
 
Variables Mean or 
% 
SD Median 
Dependent Variables     
Applied problems score 102.23 18.14 102.00 
Broad reading score 99.72 20.11 99.00 
Repeated grade (yes) 14%  0 
   children without repeating a grade in all 3 waves 62%   
   children with repeating a grade in all 3 waves 3%   
School suspension or expulsion (yes) 14%  0 
   children without school suspension in all 3 waves 54%   
   children with school suspension in all 3 waves .08%   
Global health (=excellent) 47%  0 
   children with excellent health in all 3 waves 19%   
   children without excellent health in all 3 waves 28%   
Number of school days missed  2.08 3.76 0 
   children without school days missed in all 3 waves 17%   
Number of hospitalizations  .45 1.55 0 
   children without hospitalization in all 3 waves 50%   
Number of doctor visits for illness  2.57 4.03 2 
   children without visits in all 3 waves 6%   
Doctor visits for emotional problem (yes) 30%   
   children without visits in all 3 waves 48%   
   children with visits in all 3 waves 7%   
Asset Measures    
Net worth $175,932 $1058,108 $30,500 
    Categorical measure of net worth    
        <$0 13%   
        $0-$10,000 22%   
        $10,001-$40,000 20%   
        >$40,000 45%   
Liquid assets $88,891 $942,056 $2,000 
    Categorical measure of liquid assets    
        =$0 22%   
        $1-$1,000 21%   
        $1,001-$10,000 24%   
        >$10,000 32%   
Control Variables a    
Child’s characteristics     
Age 11.25 5.50 11 
Special education (yes) 26%  0 
Disability status (yes) 49%  0 
Household background    
Head’s employment (employed) 82%  1 
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Variables Mean or 
% 
SD Median 
Household size 4.02 1.11 4 
Number of children 2.09 .98 2 
Food stamps (yes) 17%  0 
AFDC (yes) 7%  0 
SSI (yes) 6%  0 
Average income  $61.696 $72,200 $46,486 
Mother’s marital status (married) 68%  1 
Mother’s age 34.97 7.73 35 
Mother’s education   Some college 
   Less than high school 13%   
   High school 35%   
   Some college 29%   
   Four-year college and above 24%   
Mediators    
Parental involvement 5.17 3.06 5 
Parental warmth 4.03 .81 4.14 
Parenting stress 2.35 .83 2.29 
Educational expectations    4-year college 
  High school and below 26%   
  Some college  18%   
  Four-year college and above 55%   
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Table 6.3 Results of Fixed-Effects Models: Net Worth and Educational Outcomes 
 
 LM1 LM2 LM3 LM1 LM2 LM3 LM1 LM2 LM3 LM1 LM2 LM3 
 Applied Problems Score Broad Reading Score 
Log-NW .30** -.03 -.02    .28** .08 .07    
Categorical (Ref.: $0-$10,000)             
   <$0    2.21 .04 .33    2.41  -.03 -.14 
   $10,001-$40,000    .03 .42 .62    1.34 1.01 -.98 
   >$40,000    4.44*** 1.55 1.85    4.61*** 1.52 1.20 
Parental involvement   .32   .34   -.12   -.10 
Parenting warmth   -.13   -.10   -.87   -.84 
Parenting stress   -1.60***   -1.63**   .22   .24 
Educational expectations 
(Ref. group: High school or 
below) 
            
Some college   .27   .24   1.08   1.09 
    4-year college and above   1.19   1.07   3.13***   3.13** 
 Repeated Grades School Suspension/Expulsion 
Log-NW -.05** -.09*** -.11***    -.03 -.006 -.003    
Categorical (Ref.: $0-$10,000)             
   <$0    .18 1.48*** 1.43***    -.27 -.20 -.26 
   $10,001-$40,000    .18 .21* -.10    -.67** -.52*** -.60*** 
   >$40,000    -.79** -.49** -.69***    -.37 .20 .19 
Parental involvement   -.25***   -.25***   -.08**   -.07** 
Parenting warmth   -.34***   -.29**   -.06   -.09 
Parenting stress   .07   .05   .12   .12 
Educational expectations 
(Ref.: High school or below) 
            
Some college   -.34*   -.58***   -.21   -.08 
    4-year college and above   -.36*   -.39*   -.32*   -.42** 
Regression coefficients are reported in the Table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1 
 
 
 124
 
 
Table 6.4 Results of Fixed-Effects Models: Liquid Assets and Educational Outcomes 
 LM1 LM2 LM3 LM1 LM2 LM3 LM1 LM2 LM3 LM1 LM2 LM3 
 Applied Problems Score Broad Reading Score 
Log-LA .53*** .04 .04    .78*** .13 .10    
Categorical  (Ref.: $0)             
   $1-$1,000    -.02 -1.13 -1.30    3.12**  .14 -.17 
   $1,001-$10,000    1.21 -.71 -.62    2.96** .25 -.03 
   >$10,000    5.28*** .68 .58    7.40*** 1.72 1.47 
Homeownership 2.68** 1.32 1.49 2.76** 1.27 1.44 2.01 .26 .32 2.43 .23 .29 
Parental involvement   .33   .32   -.14   -.14 
Parenting warmth   -.13   -.25   -.78   -.87 
Parenting stress   -1.51**   -1.52**   .12   .13 
Educational expectations 
(Ref.: High school or below) 
            
Some college   .95   1.07   1.61   1.66 
    4-year college and above   1.95   2.02   3.64**   3.68** 
 Repeated Grades School Suspension/Expulsion 
Log-LA -.05** -.05*** -.04*    -.09*** -.009 -.009    
Categorical (Ref.: $0)             
   <$1-$1,000    .01 -.56*** -.54**    .-.62** -.27 -.32* 
   $1,001-$10,000    -.20 -.61*** -.61***    -.63** .07 -.02 
   >$10,000    -.55 .20 .31    -1.32*** -.78*** -.75*** 
Homeownership -.31 -.44*** -.88*** -.32 -.56*** -1.03*** -.07 -.30* -.41** -.08 -.27 -.38** 
Parental involvement   -.27***   -.27***   -.09***   -.09*** 
Parenting warmth   -.40***   -.47***   -.08   -.08 
Parenting stress   .07   .06   .11   .07 
Educational expectations 
(Ref.: High school  or below) 
            
Some college   -.16   -.03   -.22   -.26 
    4-year college and above   -.23   -.22   -.34*   -.30* 
Regression coefficients are reported in the Table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1 
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Table 6.5 Results of Fixed-Effects Models: Net Worth and Health Outcomes 
 
 LM1 LM2 LM3 LM1 LM2 LM3 LM1 LM2 LM3 LM1 LM2 LM3 
 Global Health Status School Days Missed 
Log-NW .03* .03** .03**    -.01 -.02*** -.03***    
Categorical (Ref: $0-$10,000)             
   <$0    .70*** .28** .30**    .06  .51*** .51*** 
   $10,001-$40,000    .82*** .73*** .67***    .15 .29*** .20*** 
   >$40,000    .91*** .95*** .90***    .03 .40*** .32*** 
Parental involvement   .02**   .03**   -.06**   -.05*** 
Parenting warmth   -.27***   -.26***   -.28**   -.27*** 
Parenting stress   -.60***   -.60***   .09   .08 
Educational expectations 
(Ref. : High school or below) 
            
Some college   -.36**   -.37**   -.19***   -.19*** 
    4-year college and above   .16   .12   -.01   -.02 
 Hospitalization Doctor Visits for Illness 
Log-NW -.05** -.04*** -.04***    -.02 -.001 .000    
Categorical (Ref: $0-$10,000)             
   <$0    .53** .53*** .59***    .22* -.001 -.04 
   $10,001-$40,000    .21 .73*** .77***    .08 .10* .09*** 
   >$40,000    -.15 .22** .28    -.08 .-.05 -.06* 
Parental involvement   -.03*   -.02   -.002   .002 
Parenting warmth   .32***   .29***   .06   .05 
Parenting stress   .06   .04   .19*   .19*** 
Educational expectations 
(Ref. : High school or below) 
            
Some college   -.60***   -.67***   -.11***   -.11*** 
    4-year college and above   -.26***   -.24***   -.28*   -.27** 
Regression coefficients are reported in the table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1 
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 LM1 LM2 LM3 LM1 LM2 LM3 LM1 LM2 LM3 LM1 LM2 LM3 
 Doctor Visits for Emotional Problems       
Log-NW .01 .06*** .07***          
Categorical  (Ref: $0-$10,000)             
   <$0    .33 .07 .01       
   $10,001-$40,000    .32 .31*** .34***       
   >$40,000    .26 .83*** 1.13***       
Parental involvement   -.13***   -.13***       
Parenting warmth   .23*   .28**       
Parenting stress   .54***   .60***       
Educational expectations 
(Ref: High school or below) 
            
Some college   -.37**   -.30**       
    4-year college/above   -.68***   -.75***       
 Regression coefficients are reported in the table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1 
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Table 6.6 Results of Fixed-Effects Models: Liquid Assets and Health Outcomes 
 
 LM1 LM2 LM3 LM1 LM2 LM3 LM1 LM2 LM3 LM1 LM2 LM3 
 Global Health Status School Days Missed 
Log-LA .05* .06*** .05***    .01 .03*** .03***    
Categorical (Ref: $0)             
   <$1-$1,000    .19 .28*** .19*    .28** .32*** .31*** 
   $1,001-$10,000    .36* .56*** .45***    .29** .44*** .36*** 
   >$10,000    .57*** .70*** .55***    .15 .10** .06 
Homeownership .03 .16 .31** .04 .14 .28** -.08 -.19** -.17* -.07 -.17** -.15* 
Parental involvement   .03**   .03**   -.07***   -.07*** 
Parenting warmth   -.27***   -.28***   -.29***   -.27*** 
Parenting stress   -.61***   -.61***   .04   .04 
Educational expectations 
(Ref: High school or below) 
            
Some college   -.39**   -.40**   -.21***   -.24*** 
    4-year college and above   .14   .12   -.11   -.12* 
 Hospitalization Doctor Visits for Illness 
Log-LA -.02 -.004 -.007    .006 .005 .005    
Categorical (Ref: $0)             
   <$1-$1,000    .09 -.08 -.13    .16 .06 .10*** 
   $1,001-$10,000    -.41* -.08 .-.08    .29** .18* .17*** 
   >$10,000    -.02 .19* .18    -.01 -.19*** -.15** 
Homeownership -.11 -.27** -.20** -.10 -.26*** -.20** .11 .12** .08* .11 .15*** .12** 
Parental involvement   -.03**   -.03**   -.002   -.003 
Parenting warmth   .31***   .33***   .06   .08** 
Parenting stress   .06   .07   .19***   .17*** 
Educational expectations 
(Ref. : High school or below) 
            
Some college   -.61***   -.58***   -.11***   -.12*** 
    4-year college and above   -.30***   -.31***   -.27***   -.26*** 
Regression coefficients are reported in the table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1 
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 LM1 LM2 LM3 LM1 LM2 LM3 LM1 LM2 LM3 LM1 LM2 LM3 
 Doctor Visits for Emotional Problems       
Log-LA -.005 -.007 -.004          
Categorical (Ref: $0)             
   <$1-$1,000    .09 -.28** -.25       
   $1,001-$10,000    -.005 .05 .18       
   >$10,000    -.11 -.48** -.40       
Homeownership .06 .09 -.05 .08 .11 -.04       
Parental involvement   -.13***   -.14***       
Parenting warmth   .24**   .24*       
Parenting stress   .50***   .53***       
Educational expectations 
(Ref: High school or below) 
            
Some college   -.45*   -.35*       
    4-year college and above   -.68**   -.60***       
Regression coefficients are reported in the table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1 
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Table 6.7 Net Worth and Child Outcomes in SEM Models 
SEM1 SEM2 Net Worth 
WI WII WIII WI WII WIII 
 Applied Problems Score 
Log-NW .04 -.13 -.23 .25* .18 .11 
Categorical        
   <$0 .41 1.82 1.56 1.94 2.07 1.70 
   $10,001-$40,000 .97 .18 1.20 .72 .07 1.47 
   >$40,000 .76 .69 .88 3.42* 3.50** 2.98** 
   Broad Reading Score 
Log-NW -.02 .001 .11    
Categorical       
   <$0 .09 2.50* 2.52 2.12 2.70 2.26 
   $10,001-$40,000 .60 -.37 2.30 1.75 -.50 1.89 
   >$40,000 .83 1.44 5.07* 3.19 3.07* 3.10** 
  Repeated Grades 
Log-NW .01 .03 -.01 .01 .008 -.02 
Categorical       
   <$0 .04 -.15 .15 .01 -.17 .15 
   $10,001-$40,000 .19 .34* .17 .13 .27 .17 
   >$40,000 .06 -.99** -.51 .03 -.21 .03 
 School Suspension/Expulsion 
Log-NW -.008 -.02 .02 -.007 -.03** .002 
Categorical       
   <$0 -.12 .09 -.07 -.05 .10 -.10 
   $10,001-$40,000 -.17 -.01 .09 -.12 -.05 .13 
   >$40,000 -.06 -.06 .02 -.009 -.05 .08 
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SEM1 SEM2 Net Worth 
WI WII WIII WI WII WIII 
 Global Health 
Log-NW .02 .02 .02 .02 -.02 .003 
Categorical       
   <$0 .07 .26 .03 .17 .18 .03 
   $10,001-$40,000 .37** .11 .02 .29** .03 .02 
   >$40,000 .40** .34 .13 .38*** .12 -.02 
 School Days Missed due to Physical Illness 
Log-NW .002 .003 .02 -.002 -.004 -.009 
Categorical       
   <$0 .09 .23 .13 .12 .22 .13 
   $10,001-$40,000 .16 .08 -.24 .13 .08 -.23 
   >$40,000 .03 .27 .04 .02 .27* .04 
 Hospitalization 
Log-NW -.02 .01 -.03 -.02 .003 -.03* 
Categorical       
   <$0 .06 .15 .28 .06 .17 .27 
   $10,001-$40,000 -.06 .15 .04 -.06 .12 .03 
   >$40,000 -.19 .05 -.10 -.16 .26 -.12 
 Doctor Visits for Physical Illness 
Log-NW .02 .02 -.006 .01 .004 -.01 
Categorical       
   <$0 -.03 .007 .20 -.07 .02 .19 
   $10,001-$40,000 -.08 -.03 .17 -.13 .01 .15 
   >$40,000 .17 .09 .13 .13 .04 .09 
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SEM1 SEM2 Net Worth 
WI WII WIII WI WII WIII 
 Doctor Visits for Emotional Problems 
Log-NW .04 .03 .05 .03* .01 -.001 
Categorical       
   <$0 -.07 -.08 -.04 -.03 .08 -.03 
   $10,001-$40,000 .13 .31 -.15 .08 .27 -.13 
   >$40,000 .34 -.17 -.06 .37* .25 -.03 
Regression coefficients are reported in the table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1 
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Table 6.8 Liquid Assets and Child Outcomes in SEM Models 
SEM1 SEM2 Liquid Assets 
WI WII WIII WI WII WIII 
 Applied Problems Score 
Log-LA .14 -.06 -.27 .73*** .37** .20 
Categorical       
   $1-$1,000 1.48 1.64 1.06 3.79** 1.59 1.75 
   $1,001-$10,000 2.53 .16 1.56 5.37*** .18 2.34 
   >$10,000 3.55* 2.02 1.28 7.41*** 3.77** 2.58* 
 Broad Reading Score 
Log-LA .06 .16 .06 .49*** .53*** .12 
Categorical       
   $1-$1,000 -.23 1.87 .07 2.77 3.19** .75 
   $1,001-$10,000 1.12 .26 1.67 2.97 1.04 1.51 
   >$10,000 2.10 2.89* 3.77 5.67*** 4.74*** 2.53* 
 Repeated Grades 
Log-LA .009 -.04 -.02 .001 -.03 -.02 
Categorical       
   $1-$1,000 .32 -.05 .16 .17 -.06 .15 
   $1,001-$10,000 -.003 .006 -.09 -.04 -.007 -.09 
   >$10,000 .26 -.27 -.04 .08 -.22 -.19 
 School Suspension/Expulsion 
Log-LA -.009 -.002 .023 -.002 -.03 -.01 
Categorical       
   $1-$1,000 -.04 -.04 -.04 .13 -.02 -.07 
   $1,001-$10,000 -.04 .08 .01 .06 .07 .02 
   >$10,000 -.10 -.27 .07 -.09 -.35* -.24 
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SEM1 SEM2 Liquid Assets 
WI WII WIII WI WII WIII 
 Global Health 
Log-LA .02 .04 .02 .03** -.008 .02 
Categorical       
   $1-$1,000 -.12 -.08 -.04 .02 -.08 -.03 
   $1,001-$10,000 .11 .00 .13 .18 -.11 .11 
   >$10,000 .14 .37 .20 .25* .03 .13 
 School Days Missed due to Physical Illness 
Log-LA .01 .04* -.001 .01 .02* -.002 
Categorical       
   $1-$1,000 .19 -.01 .06 .20 -.01 .06 
   $1,001-$10,000 .18 .11 .07 .19 .11 .06 
   >$10,000 -.07 .32 -.25 -.04 .25 -.07 
   Hospitalization 
Log-LA -.03* .01 .01 -.03* .01 .008 
Categorical       
   $1-$1,000 .02 .10 .11 .005 -.09 .10 
   $1,001-$10,000 -.39** -.09 -.07 -.37** -.06 -.07 
   >$10,000 -.08 .16 .09 -.09 .02 .03 
 Doctor Visits for Physical Illness 
Log-LA .03* -.002 .008 .03** .005 .01 
Categorical       
   $1-$1,000 .45*** .27** .11 .42*** .24* .10 
   $1,001-$10,000 .17 .04 -.01 .17 .05 -.009 
   >$10,000 .35* -.05 -.04 .33 .05 .12 
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SEM1 SEM2 Liquid Assets 
WI WII WIII WI WII WIII 
 Doctor Visits for Emotional Problems 
Log-LA .03 .001 .02 .03 .02 -.01 
Categorical       
   $1-$1,000 .38 .25 .16 .21 .19 .14 
   $1,001-$10,000 .16 .35* .03 .08 .26 .03 
   >$10,000 .39 -.03 .16 .37 .16 -.05 
Regression coefficients are reported in the table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1 
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Table 7.1 Results Summary of Four Sets of Analyses a 
 
Educational Outcomes Health Outcomes 
Asset 
Types 
Asset 
Measures 
Applied 
Problems 
Score 
Broad 
Reading 
Score 
Repeated 
Grade 
School 
Suspension/ 
Expulsion 
Global 
Health 
School 
Days 
Missed
Hospitalization Doctor 
Visits 
for 
Illness 
Doctor 
Visits for 
Emotional 
Problems 
I. The First Set of Analyses: Assets Measured before the Birth (Chapter 5) 
    Continuous    -  - - -  Net 
Worth     Categorical +  +   -  + - - -  
    Continuous     + - - -  Liquid 
Assets     Categorical - -  - - + - - -  
II. The Second Set of Analyses: Propensity Score Classification (Chapter 5) 
    Continuous          Net 
Worth     Categorical     + - -   
    Continuous     + - -   Liquid 
Assets     Categorical     + - -   
III. The Second Set of Analyses: Fixed-Effects Analyses (Chapter 6) 
    Continuous   -  + - -  + Net 
Worth     Categorical   - - + + + + + 
    Continuous   -  + +    Liquid 
Assets     Categorical   - - + +  +/- - 
IV. The Fourth Set of Analyses: SEM Analyses (Chapter 6) 
    Continuous +   -   -  + Net 
Worth     Categorical +  +  -  + +   + 
    Continuous +  +    + + - +  Liquid 
Assets     Categorical +  +   - +  - + + 
a. Only significant results are marked in the table: “+” and “-” are used to indicate positive and negative associations. 
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Table 7.2 Asset Effects on Global Health 
Asset Measures 1st  Set 2nd Set 4
th Set: 
SEM2 at WI 
Net Worth     
  Log-transformed net worth .007 .007 .02 
  Categorical measure of net worth 
  (Reference group: $0-$10,000) 
   
      <$0 .08 .11 .17 
      $10,001-$40,000 .33* .36 .29** 
      >$40,000 .41** .57* .38*** 
Liquid Assets    
  Log-transformed liquid assets .06*** .08*** .03** 
  Categorical measure of liquid assets 
  (Reference group: =$0) 
   
      $1-$1,000 .63*** .90*** .02 
      $1,001-$10,000 .39* .64*** .18 
      >$10,000 .69*** 1.18*** .25* 
***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1 
Table 7.3 Asset Effects on School Days Missed due to Physical Illness 
Asset Measures 1st Set 2nd Set 4
th Set: 
SEM2 at WII
Net Worth     
  Log-transformed net worth -.02** -.02 -.004 
  Categorical measure of net worth 
  (Reference group: $0-$10,000) 
   
      <$0 .02 -.23 .22 
      $10,001-$40,000 -.35** -.40 .08 
      >$40,000 -.56*** -.99*** .27* 
Liquid Assets    
  Log-transformed liquid assets -.30** -.07*** .02* 
  Categorical measure of liquid assets 
  (Reference group: =$0) 
   
      $1-$1,000 -.02 -.17 -.01 
      $1,001-$10,000 -.25 -.57** .11 
      >$10,000 -.42** -.65* .25 
***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1 
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Table7.4 Parenting Behavior Variables, Child Disability, and Child Outcomes 
Educational Outcomes Health Outcomes 
Variables 
Applied 
Problems 
Score 
Broad 
Reading 
Score 
Repeated 
Grade 
School 
Suspension
/ Expulsion 
Global 
Health 
School 
Days 
Missed 
Hospitalization Doctor 
Visits for 
Illness 
Doctor 
Visits for 
Emotional 
Problems 
Panel I. The First Set of Analyses: Assets Measured before Childbirth (Chapter 5) 
Parenting Behavior Variables          
Parental Involvement +** +** - -** + - - -* + 
Parenting warmth - -** + - + + +** + - 
Parenting stress + - + + - + +* +        + 
Educational expectations +*** +*** +/- -/+ + - + -/+ - 
Disability Variables           
Having disability in WI - -*** + - - + +*** + + 
Having disability in WII - -*** + - -* +* +*** +*** +** 
Panel II. The Third Set of Analyses: Fixed-effects Models (Chapter 6) 
Parenting Behavior Variables          
Parental Involvement + - -*** -** +** -*** -* - -*** 
Parenting warmth - - -*** - -*** -*** +*** + +* 
Parenting stress -*** + + + -*** + + +* +*** 
Educational expectations + +*** -* -** -** -*** -*** -*** -*** 
Disability Variables          
Whether having a  
disability in the observed  
wave  
- + +*** +*** -*** +*** +*** +*** +*** 
a. “+” and “-” are used to indicate positive and negative associations. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1 
 
 138
Figures 
 
Figure 2.1 Asset Effects for Children: Linkages from Assets to Child Well-Being 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Asset Effects for Children with Disabilities:  
Linkages from Assets to Child Well-Being 
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Figure 3.1 Child Development Supplement (CDS) and Transition into Adulthood (TA) 
in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Household Assets, Child Outcomes, and Confounding Factors 
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Figure 4.2 The First Empirical Strategy: Assets Measured Before Childbirth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Dynamic Model of Asset Effects in Structural Equations Modeling 
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Figure 5.1 Net Worth and Predicted Applied Problems Score 
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Figure 5.2 Liquid Assets and Predicted Applied Problems Score 
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Figure 5.3 Liquid Assets and Predicted Probability of Repeating a Grade 
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Figure 5.4 Net Worth and Predicted Probability of School Suspension or Expulsion 
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Figure 5.5 Liquid Assets and Predicted Probability  
of School Suspension or Expulsion 
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Figure 5.6 Net Worth and Predicted Probability of Excellent Health 
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Figure 5.7 Liquid Assets and Predicted Probability of Excellent Health 
.56
.78
.71
.8
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
P
re
di
ct
ed
 P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
of
 E
xc
el
le
nt
 H
ea
lth
$0 $1-$1000 $1001-$10000 >$10000
 
 
Figure 5.8 Net Worth and Predicted School Days Missed 
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Figure 5.9 Liquid Assets and Predicted School Days Missed 
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Figure 5.10 Net Worth and Predicted Frequency of Hospitalization 
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Figure 5.11 Liquid Assets and Predicted Frequency of Hospitalization 
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Figure 5.12 Net Worth and Predicted Doctor Visits for Illness 
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Figure 5.13 Liquid Assets and Predicted Doctor Visits for Illness 
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Figure 6.1 Net Worth and Predicted Number of School Days Missed 
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Figure 6.2 Liquid Assets and Predicted Number of School Days Missed 
.5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
P
re
di
ct
ed
 n
um
be
r o
f s
ch
oo
l d
ay
s 
m
is
se
d
0 1000 10000
Liquid Assets (LA, $)
log-LA categorical LA
 
Figure 6.3 Net Worth and Predicted Frequency of Hospitalization 
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Figure 7.1 Overestimation Risk of the Log-Transformed Asset Measure 
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Figure A.1 Procedures of Propensity Score Classification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For each imputed dataset:  
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Figure A.2 Balance Check Before and After Propensity Score Classification 
 
Figure B.1 Fixed-Effects Analysis in the Context of SEM 
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Figure B.2 Dynamic Model of Asset Effects in SEM 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Child Outcome at t Assets at t 
Assets at t+1 Child Outcome at t+1 
Assets at t+2 Child Outcome at t+2 
tε  
1tε +
2tε +
1 
1 
1 
βt 
βt+1 
βt+2 
bt+1 
bt+2 
δt+1 
δt+2 
 153
Appendix A. Procedure for Propensity Score Classification 
To control for the potential confoundedness of assets and household 
background variables, the second set of analyses uses propensity score classification 
before regression analyses (Imai & Van Dyk, 2004). First, households’ net worth and 
liquid asset values are predicted from household background predictors, and the 
predicted values are used as the propensity scores of net worth and liquid assets. Then 
the study sample is categorized into three equal groups24 based on the ranking of the 
estimated propensity score of household assets. Each group is about one-third of the 
sample. One group includes observations with the predicted asset value (net worth or 
liquid assets) in the top 33%, one group has the bottom 33%, and the middle 33% 
forms the third group. Regression models tested in the previous chapter are re-tested 
for the three groups separately. Finally, results for each group are combined as the 
average asset effects for the entire sample. 
Since observations within each group are relatively homogenous in terms of 
household backgrounds (as reflected by similar propensity scores within each group) 
while observations across groups are relatively heterogeneous, this approach can 
better control for confounding relationships between household assets and other 
household background variables. This strategy is useful especially when there are 
multiple confounding relationships that are not linear and additive.   
Procedure for Propensity Score Classification 
The procedure of propensity score classification includes several steps. Figure 
A.1 briefly describes the procedure of propensity score analyses. First, indicators of 
household background are selected to estimate the propensity score of household 
assets. These indicators are characteristics of household heads (age, gender, 
                                                 
24 I tested four, five, six, and ten groups in sensitivity tests.  
 154
employment status, and educational attainment), household size, number of children, 
participation in public programs (Food Stamp, SSI, or AFDC), and the average 
household income in the previous five years. All these variables are measured in the 
same time period as asset measures.25 As expected, some household background 
variables, such as income, education, and household heads’ age, are highly related to 
household assets. Ideally, those variables measured later than asset variables should 
not be used to predict the propensity score of household assets because they might be 
the consequence of holding assets.  
FIGURE A.1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Second, the generalized boosted regression model is used to predict net worth 
and liquid assets, respectively. As a data mining technique having considerable 
success in predictive accuracy, the generalized boosted regression model is better to 
balance household background variables for those with different levels of assets.26 
Third, based on the ranking of the estimated propensity score from the boosted 
regression, observations are categorized into three groups with equal size. Fourth, 
Models 2 and 3 in the first set of analyses (with the continuous and categorical asset 
measures, respectively—see Chapter 5 for details) are conducted in each group for all 
                                                 
25 Three criteria are used to select variables for predicting household assets: (1) 
Variables are measured no later than asset measures; (2) Variables are controlled for 
in the first set of analyses; and (3) Variables are likely to affect household asset 
accumulation. 
 
26 In fact, three models are used to estimate the propensity score of net worth and 
liquid assets. Model 1 (PSM 1) is a multivariate OLS regression simply including all 
variables mentioned above as independent variables to predict net worth and liquid 
assets. Since both net worth and liquid assets are highly skewed, Model 2 (PSM 2) 
applies skew-normal linear regression to predict net worth and liquid assets. Model 3 
(PSM 3) conducts the generalized boosted regression to predict propensity scores of 
net worth and liquid assets. This chapter only reports results from the generalized 
boosted regression. 
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outcome measures. Fifth, the estimated asset effects for each group then are combined 
across the three groups using the method proposed by Imai and Van Dyk (2004). For 
example, suppose the estimated coefficients of assets for the three groups are 
,  1, 2,and 3g gβ = with standard errors gs . Asset effects estimated within each group 
( gβ ) can be considered asset effects for a sub-sample (high, medium, and low 
expected assets). The average asset effects for the sample, then, is the mean of 
g sβ with the standard error of 2 2( ) / 3gs∑ . These steps are repeated for each of the 
ten imputed datasets. The results are further combined across the ten imputed datasets 
using the Rubin rule. For example, each imputed dataset m (m=1….10) has the 
average asset effects g mβ . According to the Rubin rule (1987), the mean of these ten 
g m
β s is the average asset effects across ten imputed datasets. Taking into account 
both within- and between-imputation variation, calculation of the standard error is 
more complex, and the formula can be referred to Rubin (1987).  
Balance Check before and after Propensity Score Classification 
To check whether propensity score classification successfully addresses the 
“observed” selection bias, I examine the relationships between household assets and 
household background variables before and after propensity score classification. If the 
significant associations between these variables disappear after classification, then 
one can say the selection bias is successfully addressed.  
Using the net worth measure as an example, this section shows the 
correlations between net worth and these background variables before and after 
propensity score classification. To do this, the ten background variables are regressed 
as dependent variables on net worth before classification. This produces ten single 
regression models. The background variables are characteristics of household heads 
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(age, gender, education, and employment status), household size, number of children, 
program participation (in food stamps, SSI, or AFDC), and the average household 
income in the previous five years. Depending on the measurement level of each 
variable, one of the following is used: OLS regression, Probit regression, and ordinal 
logistic regression.  
FIGURE A.2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The obtained p value of the net worth variable in each of these regression 
models is plotted in Figure A.2. The dotted line depicts the relationships between net 
worth and household background variables before propensity score classification, and 
the two solid lines are drawn at p=.05 and p=.1. Data points falling below these two 
solid lines show significant associations between net worth and background variables. 
The p value of net worth in five regressions is smaller than .05; the dependent 
variables of these five regressions are household head’s age, gender, employment, 
household’s participation status in the food stamp program, and household income. 
The p value of net worth in the regression of household head’s education is smaller 
than .1. In other words, before propensity score classification, household assets are 
highly correlated with most of the household background variables, and the estimated 
asset effects in the first set of analyses are likely confounded with these variables. It is 
interesting to find that net worth is not strongly associated with participation in AFDC 
and SSI, the two means tested programs. Three reasons may explain this: First, for 
about 60% of observations, asset information was collected in 1984 or 1989, when 
asset limits of AFDC and SSI were not so restricted as they are today; the median 
liquid assets for the sample is $1,600. Second, net worth includes home equity, which 
does not count against program eligibility. Third, the original scale of net worth, 
which is highly skewed, may affect regression estimation.  
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The dash-dot line in Figure A.2 plots the p value of net worth in the same 
regression after propensity score classification. To obtain these p values, the 
procedure in Figure A.1 is performed with slight modification. Rather than estimates 
asset effects, Step 4 regresses household background variables on net worth alone. 
The dash-dot line in Figure A.2 suggests that the smallest p value of net worth is 
nearly .3 greater than the cutoff threshold of .1. None of these household background 
variables is statistically correlated with household assets. After propensity score 
classification, the distribution of net worth is balanced across these household 
background variables. Therefore, it can be said with more confidence that after 
classification, the estimated asset effects are not likely to be caused by the 
associations between assets and these background variables.   
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Appendix B. Model Specification of SEM Analyses 
The fourth empirical strategy tests asset effects on educational and health 
outcomes for children with disabilities using the three-wave longitudinal data in 
Structural Equations Models (SEMs). A main technical feature of this strategy is that 
it allows the correlation between household assets and the residual in the previous 
stages to be specified and estimated. As a possible solution to the endogeneity issue in 
fixed-effects analyses (discussed in Chapter 4), it may better capture the dynamic 
relationships between household assets and child outcomes (See Equations 4.13).  
FIGURE B.1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The analyses are conducted on the same sample used for fixed-effects analyses, 
and two models are tested for each outcome measure. The first model (SEM1) adds an 
individual heterogeneous term (similar to fixed-effects analyses), and correlates 
household assets with the error term of dependent variables at the previous stage. In 
other words, SEM1 assigns a structure—current assets associated with the error term 
of outcome measures at the previous stage—to model the potential endogeneity of 
assets in fixed-effects analyses. In addition, SEM1 allows varying asset effects at 
different observation points. Figure B.1 illustrates this specification without including 
control variables. Latent variable α  refers to the individual heterogeneous term, and 
bt+1 and bt+2 are estimated correlations between household assets and the error terms 
of outcome measures at the previous stage. β is estimated asset effects on the 
outcome measure at different points in time. While intended to resemble the idea of 
fixed-effects analyses, it uses the maximum likelihood estimator instead of the fixed-
effects estimator. Another difference is that, for this strategy, the unit of analysis is 
the child and the sample size becomes smaller (therefore the power of the analyses is 
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also smaller). Finally, since SEM models are not conditional models, it can include all 
children in the analysis, including those without person-variation on outcome 
measures over time. Figure B.1 can also be expressed in the following equations (B.1):  
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The second model specification (SEM2) does not have the individual 
heterogeneous term in analyses. Instead, SEM2 assumes a dynamic relationship 
between children’s outcomes over time and includes the first-order lag of the 
dependent variable in analyses. SEM2 still allows household assets to be correlated 
with the error term of outcome measures from the previous stage. Equations 4.12 
suggest that the cumulative assets effects up until this stage can be replaced with the 
first-order lag of the dependent variable. SEM2 can be considered an empirical 
strategy reflecting this idea. Equations B.2 and Figure B.2 show the specification of 
SEM2 without control variables.  
FIGURE B.2 ABOUT HERE 
 
SEM1 and SEM2 include the same control variables as fixed-effects analyses. 
All count dependent variables (i.e., school days missed, hospitalization, and doctor 
visits for illness) are recoded into dichotomous measures, and Probit instead of 
Poisson regression is applied to these outcome measures. Given that the error term is 
the key for this strategy, and that Poisson regression for count variables do not allow 
the error term to be estimated, it is not appropriate for this strategy. Main findings are 
briefly discussed because these analyses are a further exploration based on fixed-
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effects analyses.  
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